Perspectives on the making markets work for the poor (M4P) approach by unknown
PersPectives on 
the Making Markets 
Work for the Poor 
(M4P) aPProach






PAPer 1: M4P AND eCoNoMICS  3
 
PAPer 2: M4P AND FINANCIAL SerVICeS 11
 
PAPer 3: M4P AND LABoUr 17
 
PAPer 4: M4P AND LAND 27
 
PAPer 5: M4P AND AGrICULTUre 35
 
PAPer 6: M4P AND wATer 41
 
PAPer 7: M4P AND PoLITICAL eCoNoMY 47
 
PAPer 8: M4P AND CLIMATe CHANGe 53
 TABLe oF CoNTeNTS




Perspectives on the Making Markets work for the Poor (M4P) Approach
An estimated 2.6 billion people live on less than $2 a day. over 
a billion lack clean water, 1.6 billion lack electricity and 3 billion 
lack access to telecommunications. This represents huge unmet 
needs. As many of the world’s poor live in areas with limited 
state service provision they must rely on private markets for 
their livelihoods.  As consumers, poor men and women rely on 
markets to meet their needs for food and essential services. As 
employees or producers, they sell their labour or products in 
these markets. But these markets are often difficult or costly 
to access for poor people. These markets may be informal, 
uncompetitive and may not meet the needs of the poor 
effectively.  
More widely, the world’s poor are not well integrated into 
the global economy and do not get access to its benefits. In 
Development as Freedom,  Amartya Sen describes participation 
in economic interchange as a basic part of social living and 
argues that economic freedoms are closely tied to political and 
social freedoms. The poor often lack these freedoms.
Making Markets work for the Poor (M4P) is an approach to 
poverty reduction that donors such as the Department for 
International Development (DFID) and the Swiss Agency for 
Development and Cooperation (SDC) have been supporting 
over the past few years. The central idea is that the poor are 
dependent on market systems for their livelihoods.  Therefore 
changing those market systems to work more effectively and 
sustainably for the poor will improve their livelihoods and 
consequently reduce poverty. More accessible and competitive 
markets enable poor people to find their own way out of poverty 
by providing more real choices and opportunities. Markets that 
function well have wider economic benefits too.  They stimulate 
investment and encourage firms to innovate, reduce costs and 
provide better quality jobs, goods and services to more people. 
The involvement of poor people in economic growth is the 
best way to get people out of poverty and represents the exit 
strategy for aid.  
The last few years have seen an upsurge of interest in market 
development approaches amongst aid agencies.  Alongside 
M4P there is UNDP’s Growing Inclusive Markets, the IADB’s 
Opportunities for the Majority and the IFC’s Next Four Billion. 
Amongst businesses, there is growing interest in social investment, 
sustainable business practices, fair trade and engaging with the 
Base of the (Economic) Pyramid. Although terminology and 
emphasis may differ, all of these approaches see a market-based 
economic engagement with the poor as essential for sustainable 
development.
In order to improve the understanding and uptake of 
market development approaches and to consolidate existing 
experience, DFID and SDC have commissioned a series of 
three documents on M4P.  Aimed at agency and government 
officials, consultants, researchers and practitioners, these 
together provide a comprehensive overview of the approach 
in theory and practice.
The M4P Synthesis paper explains the essence of the M4P 
approach – its rationale, including evidence of impact, and key 
features in implementation. M4P Perspectives (this document) 
introduces the conceptual underpinnings of M4P and explores 
its application in different fields including finance, agriculture, 
water, labour and climate change. These first two documents 
have been sponsored by SDC. The M4P Operational Guide 
(sponsored by DFID) provides a substantial operational 
resource on how to implement M4P, including an overview of 
good practices, common management challenges and the main 
lessons from experience.
Development of these documents was led by a team from The 
Springfield Centre. They were assisted by advice and comments 
from Marshall Bear, Gerry Bloom, richard Boulter, Don Brown, 
Jean-Christophe Favre, Tracy Gerstle, Alison Griffith, Justin 
Highstead, Joanna Ledgerwood, Marc Lundy, Luis osorio, 
Alexandra Miehlbradt, Mark Napier, Kate Philip, David Porteous, 
Peter roggekamp, Prashant rana, Hugh Scott, Dominic Smith 
and Jim Tomecko.
All of these documents are also available in electronic form 
at www.M4Pnetwork.org.  we hope you find them helpful 
in meeting the challenge of developing market systems that 
benefit poor people.
Peter Tschumi
Head of employment and Income Division
SDC, Berne 
Harry Hagan
Senior economic Adviser and Head of Growth Team
Growth & Investment Group, Policy & research Division
DFID, London
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INTroDUCTIoN
this collection of papers is part of a series of three documents 
on the Making Markets Work for the Poor (M4P) approach. 
the Synthesis presents the essence of M4P – its strategic 
rationale, key principles and the main features in its 
implementation; the M4P Operational Guide seeks to provide 
an accessible operational resource to help put the M4P 
approach into practice. 
the purpose of this document (M4P Perspectives) is to 
explore in more detail specific issues associated with M4P 
and potential areas of development endeavour where M4P 
may have application. in doing so it seeks to demonstrate 
both the conceptual context for M4P, much of it emerging 
from developments in economic thinking, and the value-added 
which M4P can bring in practice. 
Paper 1 is concerned with mapping out the relations between 
different strands of thinking in economics and M4P. the 
remainder of the papers deal with the application of M4P to 
specific market systems or issues. In each case they establish 
the relevance of these markets/issues for the poor and then 
focus on the M4P perspective on key challenges within these. 
Papers 2, 3 and 4 deal with M4P in relation to the factor 
markets of finance, labour and land; Paper 5 focuses on 
agriculture, the main livelihood source of many of the poor but 
vital to them whether as producers, labourers or consumers. 
Paper 6 concentrates on water – a field often seen as a merit 
good where consumption not only serves the individual but 
impacts on the wider economy and society. Finally, Papers 7 
and 8 deal with M4P in relation to important development 
issues which are not conventionally seen as market systems 
but where the M4P lens can add value. Paper 7 focuses on 
the political markets guiding government decision-making 
and therefore impacting across a wide spectrum of fields 
and Paper 8 highlights the M4P perspective on the series of 
markets associated with climate change.
These papers seek to present a first indication of the wider 
depth and relevance of M4P.  they cover market systems for 
economic factors, for merit goods, for key sectors and for 
critical issues such as political decision-making and climate 
change. They are not comprehensive – there are other fields 
where an M4P perspective has utility (such as education, 
health and other specific products and services) which are not 
covered here.  they represent, therefore, an initial platform 
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PAPer 1: M4P AND eCoNoMICS
introduction
M4P provides a framework for understanding economic 
systems and guiding actions to improve the way in which those 
systems serve the poor. it has emerged from observation 
of changes in the real world and from agency experience. 
It has also been influenced by newer economic theory and 
research.  As a framework rather than a philosophy in its own 
right, it draws upon and seeks to operationalise the more 
pragmatic insights of various strands of economics to address 
development challenges. 
The purpose of this paper is to map out the relations between 
economic thinking and M4P. While the Synthesis contains a 
summary of the economic rationale for M4P, the objective 
here is to set out its conceptual origins. It first offers a brief 
reminder of the importance of markets in economics and, in 
doing so, sets the context for the rest of the paper. second, it 
highlights the centrality of exchange in economics and, third, 
the limitations of conventional economics. Finally, it identifies 
a number of different schools of economic thought that have 
influenced the emergence of M4P thinking and practice.
a brief reminder: the truth about markets
In his book The Truth About Markets 1, the economist John Kay 
recounts an anecdote from the visit of the former Soviet premier, 
Nikita Khrushchev, to the United States in 1959. Khrushchev and 
his aides were dumbfounded when they visited a supermarket: 
they believed that the shelves had been specially stocked for 
their arrival. Tim Harford develops the tale further, imagining 
Khrushchev asking his US hosts “who is in charge of the supply 
of groceries in California?” Such a question may seem comical, 
but as Harford points out “the answer – nobody – is dizzying”. 2 
Kay explains the ubiquity of markets as a central organising 
principle of modern economies and their superiority over 
centralised planning in terms of their “disciplined pluralism”: the 
ability of diverse producers and consumers to make hundreds, 
thousands or even millions of decisions a day and to rapidly self-
correct – a cycle of “experiment, failure and fresh experiment” – in 
a way which the centralised planning, with which Khrushchev 
was familiar, finds impossible.
Because the world is complicated and the future is uncertain, 
decision-making in economic systems is best carried out through 
a series of small-scale experiments, frequently reviewed, and in a 
structure in which success is followed up and failure recognised 
but not blamed. Market systems did not succeed because 
business-people are cleverer than politicians. They succeeded 
because disciplined pluralism is more innovative and responsive 
to people’s needs than centralised planning.
Centralised structures cannot cope easily with a reality of 
economic life: that it is difficult to determine what the right 
thing to do is. The best recourse is to try many things on a 
small scale and see which few work. However, pluralism conflicts 
with uniformity. If government genuinely allows pluralism and 
decentralised authority, variability in the quality of what is 
provided is inevitable. It is tempting to argue that everyone 
should receive ‘the best’, but the consequence is that ‘the best’ 
will not be very good.
Disciplined pluralism tends to run contrary to the natural 
instincts of most political leaders. when governments make 
economic policies, their inclination is to suppress pluralism – to 
find the big idea – and to override discipline, often favouring 
new ventures that the market will not accept or old industries 
which the market has already rejected. That is why the record 
of government economic intervention, even in rich states, is 
generally poor.
3
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a That is not to claim that all gifts conform to quasi-market exchange principles. There can be genuinely altruistic motivations for non-monetised (and even monetised) exchange, eg ‘lending’ money to a 
 relative with no expectation of repayment. From an M4P perspective, it is important to take into account how developing markets can ‘invade’ this space (eg reduction of inter-familial financing as a result of 
 increasing access to formal borrowing) and how this might affect behaviour.
However Kay also emphasises that market economies are not 
about harnessing greed. Market economies succeeded because 
they established disciplined pluralism by putting in place a diversity 
of mechanisms which govern the behaviour of market players. 
Markets are never “free”.
This is not to deny that self-interested materialism is an important 
feature of economic life. economic systems based on appeals to 
work for the common good will fail. But self-interest is necessarily 
hedged in by complex institutions of modern economic, social 
and political life – formal regulation and implicit rules, mechanisms 
of reputation and coordination, instincts and structures of 
cooperation, feelings of solidarity. Markets only function as part of 
a social, political and cultural context.
economic motivations are therefore complex and not necessarily 
consistent. The study of human behaviour is an empirical subject. 
It cannot rely solely on a priori assumptions. Still less should it rely 
on introspection and a priori assumptions that do not correspond 
to experience. The best starting point is to expect behaviour to 
be adaptive – that people will behave in a way they are normally 
expected to in the circumstances in which they find themselves. 
This expectation will sometimes be false. economies would not 
develop otherwise. The multifaceted institutions of the market 
economy are constantly evolving. Government is an agent in that 
evolution, not a bystander, but government cannot dictate the 
process and should not seek to.
the centrality of exchange to M4P and economics: trade or 
trade off?
Market development is about markets, so that is our starting 
point. Markets are mechanisms for exchange and are at the heart 
of both M4P and conventional economic thought:
“The market mechanism, which arouses passion in favour as well as 
against, is a basic arrangement through which people can interact 
with each other and undertake mutually advantageous activities. In 
this light, it is very hard to see how any reasonable critic could be 
against the market mechanism as such.” 3
exchange is about human interaction. As our hunter-gatherer 
ancestors moved beyond isolated self-subsistence they began to 
engage with others: they began to exchange. In fact exchange 
or reciprocity predates even this time and occurs beyond the 
human species. For example, in the field of sociobiology reciprocal 
altruism has been shown to be common within and between 
many species of flora and fauna. For instance, some species of 
bats ‘lend’ each other favours, such as sharing surplus food, in 
the expectation of a returned favour in the future when they 
are short of food themselves.4  exchange permits specialisation, 
fostering more efficient use of scarce resources, and thus increases 
welfare. 
exchange – and therefore mechanisms for exchange – is not just 
about commercially traded goods and services (ie buying and selling 
of a product for a money price).  exchange can take a variety of non-
monetised forms: barter (eg two sheets of roofing for one goat), 
promises or quid pro quo arrangements (eg an IoU – I’ll help you 
harvest your rice today but will expect you to help with mine next 
week) and even gifts.  Gifts are more difficult to understand as a form 
of exchange because giving does not appear to involve any reciprocity. 
The ‘price’ of exchange is not easy to identify at first glance.  However, 
when someone gives a gift they typically expect something – often 
social – in return.  This might be the goodwill of the recipient, social 
status, acquiring favour,  expectation of future reciprocation or perhaps 
compliance with social convention (eg avoiding the embarrassment 
of turning up to a dinner party without a gift for the host).  There is a 
calculus of decision-making involved in the giving of a gift: what people 
are prepared to give is a function of who they are (eg their level of 
resources or status) and that of the recipient (how important they 
are to the giver).
Conventionally such non-monetised forms of exchange have been 
regarded as outside the realm of markets. Increasingly however, in 
economics and in the real world, the understanding of what constitutes 
a market and the applicability of concepts of exchange which underpin 
markets are far broader than they have been in the past.
The diverse forms of exchange described above are now seen as 
integral to real-world markets. More importantly, non-monetised 
exchange may be governed by the same basic economic rules as 
any other form of exchange. For exchange to occur there has to 
be some form of supply (ie seller, provider or giver) and demand (ie 
buyer, consumer or recipient); the price of exchange affects people’s 
decisions about whether to trade or not. a  
In this sense exchange is not so much about trade as trade-off. 
Understood in this broader way – as a means for examining how 
people and societies make decisions about the allocation of scarce 
resources and consequently how these decisions affect welfare 
– economics is being applied in diverse fields ranging from criminal 
science to environmental protection. The conceptual and analytical 
power of economic theories about exchange and trade-offs is being 
applied to provide a more rigorous understanding of the underlying 
motivations and incentives that govern human behaviour. In order 
to do this, however, economists have had to move beyond narrow 
assumptions of self-interest to understand what shapes human 
interaction: “only through widening of the usual assumptions [is it] possible 
to begin to understand the obstacles to advancement encountered by 
minorities”. 5
Thus, the poverty reduction agenda of M4P and the welfare 
agenda of economics overlap. M4P and economics are both 
concerned with how welfare can be improved though exchange: 
how people can become better off given scarce resources. 
PAPer 1: M4P AND eCoNoMICS
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For example, in M4P the access frontier (see Good Practice Note 
5.3 in the Operational Guide) defines “the maximum proportion of 
people in a society who could access a product or a service, given 
the current configuration of costs and market structure. The access 
frontier is clearly affected by regulatory as well as technological 
considerations, which will affect what is supplied, at what price, to 
which consumers in a market.”6 The access frontier has parallels 
with economic concepts such as production possibility frontiers 
and edgeworth Boxes for utility maximisation. 
the limits of markets and conventional economic thought
whilst there is little disagreement about the centrality of markets 
to economics, there is more discomfort about the extent to which 
economic theory can be applied to the real world. In particular 
there are well-documented concerns about the applicability 
of conventional economic theory (ie neo-classical-Keynesian) 
as a basis for real-world policy-making and decision-taking. In a 
similar vein, there are concerns about how far market-oriented 
approaches can be applied to the context of the poor. 
These concerns are partly ideological and partly a genuine 
response to the proximity of conventional economic theory and 
the market-based policy prescriptions applied by development 
agencies and governments during the 1980s and 90s (and 
still prominent today). This is best typified by the so-called 
washington Consensus of reforms to “stabilise, privatise and 
liberalise” markets. The efficacy of such prescriptions has been 
examined in detail and does not bear repeating at length here.7 8 
In short, such policy prescriptions are now regarded as rigid 
and formulaic and their efficacy has been found to be mixed. 
Significantly, while these macro-economic prescriptions gained 
widespread acceptance, micro-economic aspects of reform 
were often neglected. Nevertheless they too have come to be 
associated with neo-liberalism and ‘market fundamentalism’, an 
association which often extends to market development 
specifically. 
In a rush to discard conventional economic theory and policy 
there is a risk of ‘throwing the baby out with the bath water’. 
These prescriptions were indeed narrow and the economic 
thinking upon which they were based did not reflect the state of 
economic knowledge. The market development approach itself is 
partly a response to the narrow, formulaic prescriptions of many 
economic reform efforts. However, policy-makers would be 
foolish to ignore the power of the concept of exchange or recipro-
city which lies at the heart of conventional economic theory. 
Therefore it is necessary to briefly examine some basic features 
of conventional economics b and the criticisms levelled against 
it before going on to explore how wider economic theory 
and the M4P approach responds to them, laying out a broader 
and more realistic representation of economic thinking and 
of markets. In doing so, we will make a shift from markets to 
market systems as understood within M4P.
Markets are defined narrowly in conventional economics theory. 
The conventional economic view of markets is as a deus ex 
machina which will find a price which clears supply and demand. 
The setting of prices is seen as the central function of markets 
and social welfare is optimised in perfectly functioning markets 
(after Pareto). ‘Perfect’ here means that markets are assumed 
to be completely competitive and adjust prices instantaneously 
to achieve economic equilibrium (after Arrows and Debreu). 
More specifically, equilibrium theory assumes markets are 
characterised by a number of conditions:
l Atomicity: where there are a large number of buyers and 
 sellers in a given market – each so small that their actions have 
 no significant impact on others – there are no monopolies or 
 monopsonies. Sellers are ‘price takers’, meaning that the 
 market sets the price that they must choose. 
l Homogeneity:   where goods and services are perfect substitutes, 
 meaning that there is no product differentiation – all sellers 
 offer an identical product. 
l Rationality: sellers aim to maximise utility and buyers aim to 
 maximise profits.
l Perfect information: all buyers and sellers have complete 
 information on the prices being asked and offered in other 
 parts of the market and are able to evaluate the utility that will 
 be derived from a transaction. 
l Equality of access and no asset specificity: all sellers have access 
 to factors of production and those factors do not suffer from 
 ‘asset specificity’, ie they are perfectly mobile and transferrable 
 between alternative uses. 
l Freedom of entry and exit: any seller may enter or exit the 
 market as it wishes – there are no barriers to entry. 
l Individual buyers and sellers act independently: the market is 
 such that there is no scope for groups of buyers and/or sellers 
 to come together with a view to changing the market price 
 – collusion and cartels are not possible. 
l No externalities: only the parties involved directly in a 
 transaction benefit from that transaction – third parties are 
 not impacted upon (positively or negatively) by the economic 
 decisions of others.
Conventional economics does recognise that these conditions 
do not always hold and as a consequence markets fail. ‘Market 
failure’ occurs for a number of reasons. 
b By ‘conventional economics’ this paper refers to economic theory as commonly taught to economics undergraduates in many western universities. John Kay (see references) refers to this as the “American  
 Business Model” school of thought.
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First, an agent in a market can gain market power, allowing 
them to block other mutually beneficial gains from trade 
from occurring. This can lead to inefficiency due to imperfect 
competition, which can take many different forms, such as 
monopolies, monopsonies, cartels or oligopoly. 
Second, the actions of an agent can have positive or negative 
externalities, which are innate to the methods of production, or 
other conditions important to the market.
Finally, some markets can fail due to the nature of certain goods, 
or the nature of their exchange. For instance, goods can exhibit 
the attributes of public goods or common-pool resources, 
while markets may have significant transaction costs,c agency 
problems,d or asymmetry of information.e
The underlying cause of market failure is often seen as a 
problem of property rights. An agent’s control over the uses 
of their commodities can be imperfect, because the system of 
rights which defines that control is incomplete. Typically, this falls 
into two generalised rights – ‘excludability’ and ‘transferability’. 
excludability deals with the ability of an agent to control who 
uses their commodity, and for how long – and the related costs 
associated with doing so. Transferability reflects the right of an 
agent to transfer the rights of use from one agent to another, 
for instance by selling or leasing a commodity, and the costs 
associated with doing so. If a given system of rights does not 
fully guarantee these at minimal (or no) cost, then the resulting 
distribution can be inefficient.
As a result of these failures, markets can be incomplete or 
dominated by the powerful, transactions can be costly and 
information inadequate. Conventional economic theory suggests 
that these market failures generate ‘public goods’ requiring 
compensatory intervention by government. 
Criticisms of conventional economic theory stem not from the 
fact that it makes too many simplifications, because any theory is 
always an abstraction and is built on simplifications, but from the 
fact that the simplifications made are too distant from the real 
world that the theory is trying to describe. These simplifications 
or assumptions have always been accepted as unrealistic but the 
scale of their significance has tended to be underestimated. The 
emphasis on mathematical models in conventional economics 
– built on similar assumptions – has also been criticised for 
furthering its flight from relevance, making it a “means to escape 
from reality rather than a tool to help understand it”. 9
For example, under the most simplistic definition and assumptions 
of theory, firms and other forms of economic organisation (eg 
hierarchical relations within large organisations) would not exist 
– since ‘perfect’ markets do not require them, just many perfectly 
informed and rational buyers and sellers.  This patently does not 
reflect real world markets.
Critics point out that these failures are not exceptions but the 
norm; they describe the prevailing reality of markets. Market 
failure is therefore too pervasive and static a concept to be 
useful, prescribing a fixed role for government which assumes 
perfect government is the antidote to imperfect markets: 
“The traditional private-public good dichotomy is unlikely to provide 
an effective or useful guide to policy-makers or a sufficient basis for 
understanding…”10
 
from markets to market systems: markets as complex social, 
political and economic constructs
 
Many strands of economic thought examine some of the 
simplifications or assumptions of conventional economics, 
the results of which – taken together – help develop a more 
nuanced and realistic picture of how markets work. Some of 
these strands build directly on conventional theory, others don’t. 
M4P draws on these various strands of economic thinking in its 
understanding of market systems as complex social and political, 
as well as economic constructs.
As Sen points out:
“The problems that arise spring typically from other sources and 
include such concerns as the adequate preparedness to make use 
of market transactions, unconstrained concealment of information 
or unregulated use of activities that allow the powerful to capitalise 
on their asymmetrical advantage. They have to be dealt with not 
by suppressing markets, but by allowing them to function better 
and with greater fairness and with adequate supplementation. The 
overall achievements of markets are deeply contingent on political 
and social arrangements.” 11
This section briefly examines the following major strands of 
economic thought and links them to M4P:
l Institutional economics
l economics of information
l Behavioural economics
l Public choice economics
l evolutionary economics
l Market microstructure
In doing so, it retains a strong emphasis on the concept of 
exchange and motivations for exchange: a central focus of M4P 
is on understanding and working with such incentives.
c  The cost incurred in making an economic exchange.
d  The situation where individuals (‘agents’) who are placed in control of resources belonging to another party (‘principals’) use their delegated authority over those resources to serve their own interests  
 rather than the interests of the ‘principals’.  
e  The situation where one party to a transaction has more or better information than the other party. 6
figure 1
transaction costs and the multi-function, multi-player market system
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institutional economics
M4P’s view of market systems as multi-function, multi-player 
arrangements builds directly on institutional economics 
(Figure 1).  Institutions are understood as the constraints 
imposed by society; the explicit or implicit rules of that society. 
A market is one such institution: a set of rules which govern 
exchange. Institutional economics asserts that markets are 
much more than price-setting mechanisms: in fact prices are 
the outcome of the way in which markets work, which in turn 
is shaped by how markets reduce transaction costs – the costs 
of exchange.12 Transaction costs are distinguished from the 
costs of producing a good or service, which would be the same 
regardless of the buyer.  Transaction costs will vary uniquely for 
each buyer-seller exchange and they take two main forms:
l Costs incurred before the transaction or ex ante costs – 
 searching for buyers and sellers, bargaining to reach a ‘deal’ and 
 contracting the deal. 
l Costs incurred after the transaction or ex post costs – 
 monitoring and enforcement to ensure that a deal is fulfilled as 
 contracted.
The size of these costs relative to the underlying transaction 
and their distribution between buyer and seller determine the 
nature of the market in a good or service. M4P recognises that 
these costs can disproportionately affect the poor’s ability to 
participate in markets.
Unlike conventional economics’ deus ex machina, institutional 
economics sees markets as created constructs: “Markets are 
institutions that exist to facilitate exchange; that is they exist to 
reduce the cost of carrying out transactions.”13 For M4P this 
understanding is vital as it implies that markets can be altered – 
to make them work more favourably for the disadvantaged.
In focusing on a variety of endogenous factors that influence 
the way in which markets work – the rules of the game – 
institutional economics has a strong political economy dimension 
and relates to a range of other strands of economic thought, 
specifically economics of information, behavioural economics 
and evolutionary economics. It also relates to the “growth 
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economics of information 
The economics of information studies how information affects 
behaviour. Information has economic value because it allows 
individuals to make decisions that yield higher expected utility 
than they would obtain from choices made in the absence of 
information. 
Unlike conventional theory, information is recognised to have 
special characteristics in comparison to other goods, making it 
prone to asymmetry between different parties: information is 
easy to create and disseminate but hard to trust and control 
and can influence many decisions. Information asymmetry can 
create market inefficiencies such as adverse selection and moral 
hazard, where economic agents with more information can 
exploit their position relative to those with less information.
A variety of economists, most notably Joseph Stiglitz15, have 
analysed various information-related inefficiencies, their effects 
on incentives, and mechanisms which overcome information 
problems such as screening and signalling. Such mechanisms 
relate to institutional economics and its emphasis on the ability 
of markets to reduce transaction costs, such as search costs. 
The importance of information in information-constrained 
developing country contexts, and how these can be overcome, 
is central to the M4P approach. For example, in M4P market 
‘supporting functions’ often relate to information. 
Behavioural economics
Behavioural economics seeks to unpack the concept of rational 
homo economicus to better understand how human factors (eg 
heuristics – basing decisions on rule of thumb; framing – the 
way a problem is presented to a decision-maker affects action 
taken) influence the decisions of (socio-) economic agents and 
explain so-called “market anomalies”, ie outcomes which do not 
conform to conventional theory.16 
Behavioural economics draws on psychology and examines 
the importance of perceptions, incentives and motivation in 
determining decisions. This relates strongly to M4P’s emphasis 
on political economy and understanding and working with 
the incentives of market players. In understanding that market 
players can ‘learn’ more efficient behaviour it also suggests that 
markets can be changed. There is also evidence that some 
patterns of behaviour are suboptimal but cannot be learned or 
unlearned, hence there is new emphasis on ‘nudging’ consumers 
towards better outcomes by framing choices in ways which 
make the optimal solution more likely to be chosen. This relates 
to supporting functions, such as mechanisms for transparency, 
disclosure or consumer education, in M4P.17
Public choice economics 
In public choice economics, economic tools are applied to study 
problems that conventionally are regarded as within the realm 
of political science. It applies the concepts of exchange and 
motivation to examine, for example, the behaviour of voters, 
politicians and government officials and how they interact in 
a socio-political system to achieve certain ends given scarce 
resources. Like M4P, public choice economics seeks not only to 
explain the status quo (‘what is’) but also to identify problems 
and suggest how a system could be improved by changes in 
rules and supporting functions (‘what might be’).18 M4P applies 
a similar framework of exchange, rules and supporting functions 
to examine fields of a more social or political nature, be that the 
provision of water, housing or investment climate (see Paper 7). 
evolutionary economics
evolutionary economics draws on biology and focuses on 
interdependency, competition and change within market 
systems. It is significant because it seeks to move beyond the 
static analysis of conventional economic theory and examine 
the reasons for dynamism in systems, emphasising the process of 
change inherent within economic development. It explores the 
transformation, not of raw materials, but of ideas and knowledge, 
which determine the way a ‘system’ works. It therefore has many 
parallels with the M4P approach, for example the concept of 
“creative destruction” (after Schumpeter), and is consistent with 
M4P’s catalysts for change and “disruptive innovation”. 
There are also important links with M4P (and institutional 
economics) in terms of the dichotomy between ‘ceremonial’ 
and ‘instrumental’ factors, where ‘ceremonial’ relates to 
patterns of past activity or precedents (crudely, institutions) 
and ‘instrumental’ relates to the technological imperative and 
future consequences (crudely, innovations).19 Furthermore, in 
highlighting the evolutionary nature of markets, evolutionary 
economics recognises that it is essential to have mechanisms that 
can sustain dynamism (eg for selection, generation of innovation 
and variation, transmission and replication, etc) which is very 
similar to M4P’s emphasis on multi-function and multi-player 
systems, the importance of a sustainability analysis and a view of 
markets moving towards greater complexity and sophistication 
over time.
Market microstructure
Market microstructure theory has emerged primarily from the 
field of financial markets and is “the study of process and outcomes 
of exchanging assets under a specific set of rules... [it] focuses 
on how specific trading mechanisms affect the price formation 
process”.20 It recognises the different nature of specific markets 
and consequently the market structure and design – including 
supporting functions and rules in M4P terminology – needed to 
underpin those markets, for example price formation and price 
discovery, transaction and timing costs, trade intermediation, 
information and disclosure and rules and regulations. Like M4P, 
market microstructure theory endeavours to understand ‘what 
makes markets work’, recognising that markets are not generic.
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The strands described above are by no means exhaustive, 
but they have in common an attempt to develop a more 
sophisticated understanding of economic exchange in the real 
world.  This is precisely what M4P tries to do in its view of 
market systems, incorporating a variety of forms of commercial 
and non-commercial, monetised and non-monetised elements – 
firms, hierarchies, gift exchange – into a broader understanding 
of what is meant by ‘market’.  
M4P recognises the importance of understanding the alignment 
of key market functions and players and the incentives and 
motivations of those players, as the key to understanding why 
markets are currently suboptimal.  It uses this understanding 
as the basis for trying to identify ‘what might be’ – to stimulate 
sustainable changes in market systems that are more 
pro-poor. 
As in economics, M4P also seeks to apply market systems 
concepts more broadly. If we recognise the centrality of human 
interaction and exchange to social and economic development, 
and that exchange is governed by a wider system, we can see 
that the M4P framework need not be confined solely to the 
world of business and commerce, but has wider relevance to 
fields of a more social nature. whilst controversial to some, this 
reflects a trend to apply economic thinking to fields that are 
traditionally regarded as non-economic. 
Finally, although M4P draws from the strands of economic 
thought described above, it recognises that any economic 
model is a simplified construct of reality – real-world market 
systems are not models. There is no universal set of rules for 
economic development. Markets are highly context-specific and 
economists and M4P practitioners alike need to analyse them 
rigorously and open-mindedly on a case-by-case basis if they are 
to understand and change them.
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introduction
This paper focuses on the application of M4P to financial 
services. It first establishes the importance of financial services 
in relation to growth and access. It then highlights a number of 
key issues in developing financial services markets and views 
these through the ‘lens’ of M4P.  in doing so it outlines the 
value of M4P in relation to clarity of analysis and guidance for 
intervention. It concludes with comments on the applicability 
and limitations of M4P in financial services markets.
importance and relevance to the poor
Financial markets are central to the overall performance of 
economies and to their ability to reduce poverty. Financial 
markets can reduce transaction costs, facilitating the exchange 
of goods and services and enabling more efficient allocation 
of resources. when functioning well, financial markets provide 
the basis for growth and development, especially for the poor 
who, with fewer resources, may be more dependent on them 
to access liquidity and protect their savings. Conversely, financial 
markets that are not working well inhibit exchange and deter and 
distort investment. Poorly functioning financial markets hamper 
the development prospects of low-income people specifically 
and of economies generally – in extreme cases severely.
Financial markets in various forms are pervasive in economies. 
In providing a means through which individuals with a surplus 
can transfer funds to those with a shortage, financial markets 
facilitate the intermediation of savings into investment allowing 
consumption smoothing and funds for investment.  They generate 
information on potential investment options that guides decisions 
as to the most productive allocation of resources. Through 
credit and insurance services, people’s capacity to diversify 
and manage risk is enhanced and entrepreneurial behaviour 
and economic dynamism is encouraged. At an aggregate level 
financial markets provide a means through which scarce capital 
can be mobilised, nationally and internationally, and used for 
substantial investments. Specialist financial markets, for example 
housing finance or stock exchanges, enable people and firms to 
acquire assets as a basis for growth and/or higher incomes.
The obvious importance and centrality of financial markets has 
been one key reason why they are a focus for governments’ 
and development agencies’ attention. In relation to poverty 
reduction, financial markets are important in two related ways: 
growth and access. 
Financial markets can be a powerful driver of economic growth 
– the most important determinant of poverty reduction. There 
is clear evidence to illustrate that a stronger financial system, by 
allowing resources to find their most efficient use, contributes 
significantly to growth.1 At a firm level, limited access to finance 
is frequently cited by entrepreneurs as a major constraint 
to business performance.2 Stronger financial systems are 
closely associated with new enterprise formation, growth and 
innovation. In particular, better-functioning financial markets 
tend to create new opportunities for those who previously had 
limited access, for example small firms – whose use of external 
finance is typically half that of larger firms (between 15% and 
30% according to the world Bank’s Investment Climate Surveys).
11
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Financial services used by poor people may be a direct 
contributor to poverty reduction. Safe savings services encourage 
people to accumulate usefully large sums which may allow them 
to plan their investment and consumption beyond the day to 
day.  Access to appropriate forms of working capital encourages 
personal and business investments. Insurance services help to 
provide protection from income or expenditure shocks. Bank 
accounts allow people to receive remittances cheaply and safely. 
Use of these types of formal financial services is frequently 
regarded as a stepping stone to full inclusion in the mainstream 
economy. 
Informally, of course, the poor often have their own financial 
institutions – savings clubs, funeral insurance or money guards.3 
However, the risks from the use of unregulated and informal 
mechanisms are often relatively high – for example, survey work 
in Africa found that many more clients in the informal sector 
reported that they had lost some of their savings, compared with 
the formal sector.4 These factors have made the development of 
formal financial services for the poor a key public policy priority. 
In practice, the empirical evidence supporting a focus on the 
poor per se is slightly ambiguous (see below), but the wider 
benefits afforded by inclusion are acknowledged widely. For 
example, in South Africa, “access to financial services is an ID 
card, establishing economic citizenship”.a In general, expanding the 
access frontier for financial services is a core policy objective 
shared by governments and development agencies.
key challenges in developing financial markets: the M4P 
perspective
The central relevance of financial services to the task of poverty 
reduction has raised a number of critical issues and dilemmas 
for development agencies and governments.
For each of these, M4P,  as an approach that is about under- 
standing and then acting to change markets, offers either 
improved clarity in analysis or guidance for intervention, ie 
it is both about what agencies do and how they do it. M4P’s 
value-added stems from, among other features:
l developing a transparent view of a market system and of the 
 functions (core transactions, rules and supporting functions) 
 and players within it; 
l building interventions on the basis of a detailed understanding 
 of markets and the poor within them; 
l identifying underlying systemic constraints (and therefore 
 distinguishing between symptoms and causes); and 
l placing sustainability at the heart of the intervention process.
Modernism and activism: which path to follow?
Many of the debates in financial services circles over how to 
act to promote more inclusive and better-functioning financial 
sectors are summarised in the “modernism – activism” debate (a 
phrase coined by Honohan and Beck).5 These two perspectives 
on reform can be characterised as follows:
l Modernism: this perspective emphasises the importance of 
 creating an appropriate enabling environment for large-scale 
 finance, especially appropriate macro-economic management 
 and the information, judicial, contractual and accounting 
 frameworks impinging on finance. encouraging competition is 
 seen to be important and the role of government is regarded 
 as limited. efforts at reform often involve the development 
 of suitable ‘best practice’ – often taken from higher-income 
 economies. In developing a sound functioning market system 
 for finance, modernists argue that the conditions for improved 
 services for the poor will emerge.
l Activism: this perspective stresses reaching out directly 
 to priority but excluded groups – low-income households, 
 agriculture, small business, etc.  A variety of special interventions 
 are likely to be favoured – restrictive legislation, protection 
 for consumer rights and support for a small number of quasi- 
 commercial or community providers, such as village savings 
 and loan associations.6 A feature of past prescriptions has been 
 interest rate controls to ‘protect’ the poor from the effects of 
 untrammelled usury but this is less common now. In promoting 
 separate measures for the poor, activists argue that a relatively 
 laissez-faire approach will not address the problems of the 
 excluded quickly, if at all.
The M4P perspective: grounding interventions in the market system 
(now and in the future)
The modernist and activist views, while substantially different, 
share a number of features. The modernist view sets out a 
vision of how financial services should operate, emphasising 
mainstream private sector providers and the state in an enabling 
role as the designer and enforcer of key rules. while in general 
this might be considered a valid view of the future, in practice 
its institutional prescriptions tend to be: 
l imported from international experience and fail to take 
 adequate account of local context and the poor within this (eg 
 the need to change deposit regulations to encourage providers 
 for low-income groups); and 
l rather formulaic and theoretical, failing (again) to appreciate 
 the need to adapt to local constraints. For example, to play 
 a more active role in promoting product development when 
 providers’ innovation record is weak or to build financial 
 literacy programmes into market systems when a substantial 
 proportion of would-be customers have little or no experience 
 of formal financial services.
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Activism on the other hand tends to: 
l respond to symptoms of weak performance directly rather 
 than considering underlying causes; 
l promote a ‘do it ourselves’ attitude that may be less patient 
 in identifying and working with potential local partners, but 
 does permit flexibility in initiating innovative new services. This 
 is especially the case in weak environments where constraints 
 are more severe and pervasive and light touch approaches to 
 facilitation are less likely to succeed;
l support direct delivery – if not of services then of other 
 supporting functions (such as product development, technical 
 or marketing support) – often at a high cost;
l see longer-term market system sustainability as a distant 
 concern – the implied view of the future is one with separate 
 institutions for the poor and with no obvious way in which 
 these can be mainstreamed.
An M4P perspective allows the more positive features of each 
of the above approaches to be adopted and their limitations 
to be addressed. It builds on a strong understanding of the 
local market and institutional context and of the poor within 
this – this is its starting point. It focuses interventions on the 
systemic constraints impinging on financial markets and it has 
no restriction on intervention type other than that these are 
consistent with pursuit of a sustainable vision of the future. It 
thus combines the overall strategic modernist analysis with the 
flexible operational means of activism to shape interventions 
appropriately.
Growth or access: which is an appropriate focus for poverty 
reduction?
The evidence supporting a positive causal linkage between 
financial services’ development, growth and poverty reduction 
is relatively strong. However, the arguments supporting a 
positive relationship between access and poverty are less well 
founded. Intuitively and anecdotally, financial services appear 
to be important in helping low-income households manage 
their lives better and plan a path to escape poverty. Yet there is 
mixed and limited evidence to link access with an improvement 
in household welfare. Indeed, finance may be more poverty-
reducing when it is used by non-poor but still excluded people. 
In the context of formal usage rates of 10-30% in low income 
countries (compared with over 90% in the oeCD), this group 
still makes up a sizeable segment of the population and it is 
argued that they are better able to use credit for productive 
purposes and thus contribute to growth.7
This efficiency versus equity debate has been given greater 
urgency in recent years by the spread of entitlement/rights-based 
arguments to finance; the view that basic finance, much like water 
or children’s education, can be seen as a merit good and that 
policy-makers should aspire to provide universal access.8 
The M4P perspective: acknowledging how poor people benefit 
from financial services
M4P recognises that poor people can benefit from market 
development in a number of ways. In financial services this might 
be as direct consumers of formal services, for example as savers 
or as borrowers. Although evidence of direct poverty-reducing 
impacts is mixed, there are strong economic and social reasons 
for supposing that more inclusive financial access promotes a 
more cohesive and productive basis for other development 
goals.
However, financial services often impact most forcibly on the 
poor not in their capacity as direct consumers but indirectly 
through the labour market. More effective SMe or agriculture 
finance can improve output and labour productivity and allow 
higher incomes for the poor as labourers/employees. Indirect 
effects may be less immediately tangible but they are often 
more important. 
one corollary of this acknowledgement of the different routes 
to ‘make financial markets work for poor people’ is that M4P 
encourages choice and plurality in financial markets. rather than 
focusing attentions on one (or one type of) provider, diversity 
and competition is encouraged. In particular, although ‘providers 
for the poor’ may be important, mainstream financial players 
are seeking to downscale to ‘smaller’ clients – for example, 50% 
of credit for the unbanked in Mexico comes from department 
stores. Inevitably this serves the most able and resourced of the 
excluded (and not the poorest) but is likely to provide the basis 
for larger-scale and more sustainable development.
In addition, as cash transfer schemes have become more 
popular among governments and donors as a means of getting 
resources directly to the poorest, so the financial services 
which may be provided as part of making the transfers (into an 
account for example) or linked to them (such as access to credit 
for productive purposes) are also receiving more attention.9
How can subsidies be used to promote access?
The constraints preventing poor households from using financial 
services may be of various kinds – physical remoteness, arduous 
documentation requirements, inappropriate product design 
and delivery mechanisms, etc. overcoming these problems 
and extending access dramatically often requires some public 
subsidy – initially at least. The question is: subsidy for what and 
for how long?
Conventionally, subsidies have been used to support the 
delivery of services to poor populations through pro-poor 
finance organisations – microfinance institutions (MFIs). 
Discrete, organisation-specific support for MFIs has been the 
main focus of development agencies for the last two decades. In 
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that time the number of MFI clients (of organisations reporting 
to the MicroFinance Summit) has grown to 113m.b Yet, there 
are just eight countries where the proportion of the population 
covered by MFIs is more than 2%10 and, although a precise 
figure is not available, only between one-quarter and a half of 
MFIs are financial sustainable.
Concerns over the efficacy of MFI-focused financial services 
development – both in terms of outreach and sustainability – 
has been one reason for the new emphasis on ‘inclusive financial 
sectors’11 and, with this, renewed questioning of the purpose of 
subsidies to MFIs. Given the inherent high unit cost of delivery 
to poor households, do subsidies need to be general and 
long-term in duration? Should they be focused on organisational 
delivery or could they be aimed at the specific factors – for 
example, products, information, services, technology, etc – that 
hinder ‘normal’ commercial outreach?
The M4P perspective: using subsidies to extend the access frontier
The success of MFIs can be assessed both in terms of the 
numbers of people benefiting from their services and, arguably 
more importantly, through the role they have played in changing 
global perceptions of the poor – from beneficiaries of charity 
to discerning consumers. In so doing they have helped to 
mainstream the poor, to bring them to the attention of ‘normal’ 
market players and to lay the basis for more fundamental 
change. However, beyond this, because of their limited outreach 
and widespread continued dependency on external subsidies, 
the wider impact of MFIs has been more questionable. M4P 
recognises the achievements and limitations of MFI-focused 
development and its approach to subsidies emerges from this 
context.
In M4P,  the primary purpose and role of subsidies is clear : short-
term and catalytic aimed at overcoming systemic constraints, 
developing market functions and in pursuit of a future picture of 
market sustainability. In practice this means that subsidies: 
l are often aimed at constraints in the supporting functions and 
 rules surrounding a core market (Figure 1) – for example, 
 in the development of information, innovation and consulting 
 services or the rules related to provision for low-income  
 groups; and
l seek to develop sustainable provision mechanisms for these 
 – rather than deliver directly.
In refocusing subsidies, M4P is aiming to extend the realistic 
frontier of access for financial market systems – defined by the 
existing level of knowledge, information and technology, etc. In 
this context, subsidies aim to create the space and opportunity 
to crowd-in more players (Figure 2). Direct subsidies may of 
course still be justified, especially in the weakest markets, and 
some argue that for basic bank accounts – which may be the 
point of entry to the formal sector and where finance has 
merit good characteristics – there is a justification for continued 
subsidy. But the overall direction of subsidy is clear ; facilitating 
the market system’s development rather than supporting the 
operations of selected organisations.
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The key focus of interventions in financial services in M4P










S  = Supply
D = Demand
M4P priorities
main focus - facilitating
systemic change
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c The different experience of mobile banking in Kenya and South Africa bears testament to the importance of appropriate regulations. In the latter country, relatively restrictive regulation has curtailed  
 competition and scale; in the former a relatively free regulatory environment has allowed major development, although its unregulated nature also raises risks for consumers.
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What should be the main elements in an ‘environment that 
enables’ effective financial services?
The ‘holy grail’ in financial services development is the creation 
of an environment that promotes the development of effective, 
inclusive and sustainable services. The main elements in such 
an environment are a key consideration for governments 
and agencies. In particular, what rules/regulations should 
be developed? How should these be enforced? And what 
information ‘infrastructure’ should be developed?13
The regulatory context is set by a number of ‘rules’ and the 
processes through which these are enforced – for example 
prudential regulation, anti-money laundering legislation 
and consumer protection – aimed primarily at protecting 
depositors and maintaining the stability of the financial system. 
An emerging challenge is the extent to which these rules can 
be adapted to reflect access objectives and the advance of 
technology-enabled services such as m-finance.c Furthermore, 
the regulations and enforcement mechanisms surrounding 
credit in particular – such as the performance of commercial 
courts, supervisory bodies, accountancy standards and land 
registries – impacts hugely on the performance of the sector. 
The information infrastructure for financial sector players can 
take the form of formal organisations such as credit bureaux, 
business consultants and consumer education programmes 
and, informally but still important, information on product ideas 
and processes. 
The relative importance of rules versus information may vary – 
although it has been argued that, in a context where rules and 
enforcement are often difficult to change quickly, improving the 
information context is a more immediate and practical target 
for change. But clearly, both are important.
The M4P perspective: bringing clarity to systemic change in 
financial markets
There is greater recognition that scale and sustainability in 
financial services requires change throughout the financial 
system. However, what systemic change means in practice is 
less clear. 
M4P’s market system framework provides a means through 
which improved transparency and clarity can be brought to bear 
on financial systems and therefore to the task of development. 
Beyond the core of the market – delivery of services from 
providers to consumers – the wider market system can be 
considered under the headings of rules and supporting functions 
– providing the market with its capacity to sustain change over 
a period of time. A range of possible rules and functions will be 
of more or less importance depending on the context, in each 
case focused primarily on risk mitigation, transparency, efficiency 
and cost reduction and innovation.
Many supporting functions will themselves be service markets 
– for example process, product and efficiency services offered 
through consultants. These can be assessed and developed in 
the same way as financial services markets as a whole. Indeed, it 
is necessary to do so if agencies, having appreciated the dangers 
of distortion and dependency in the financial services market, 
are to avoid a similar effect in these interconnected markets. 
What should be the role of government in promoting 
pro-poor functioning financial markets?
The centrality of finance in economies and the large externalities 
associated with it make government involvement necessary and 
important. But debates continue over what that role should be. 
Direct government provision of services, although (in general) 
less common than before, still takes place and is considered 
important – especially in relation to savings. Government-
directed credit through state banks is also still prominent, 
although the scope for political interference, delinquency and 
wider market distortion is widely recognised and few observers 
espouse this as ‘best practice’. 
Government’s role in developing and enforcing an appropriate 
regulatory environment for financial markets is considered 
generally to be their highest priority, since it is essentially a 
role that only they can play. Less clear is whether governments 
should seek to influence the ‘informal rules’ that shape financial 
players’ performance – for example through ‘ideal’ targets for 
access.14 It is also unclear what role governments should play in 
the development of services associated with information, new 
technology or financial education. These are often undertaken 
as private services but, it might be argued, have sufficient 
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The M4P perspective: clarifying the role of government
M4P requires that clarity is introduced in relation to the functions 
in the market systems and with respect to who plays (and pays 
for) these roles both currently and in the future. M4P does 
not provide a specific prescription on what roles government 
should play but in setting out a transparent framework it does 
offer a basis for more open scrutiny and analysis of roles. 
This is particularly useful in considering what roles government 
should play in the future. The key principles underpinning the roles 
government should play – consistent with core competence, 
capacity and incentives – are well-known but still there are 
considerable differences between the roles of government in 
different contexts. Government’s role with respect to the range 
of supporting functions is often most difficult to ascertain. 
Increasingly many of these functions – information, credit 
checking, product development, technology support, human 
resources – are provided by the private sector. Arguments can 
be made for a government role either as a temporary facilitator 
or more permanently. The advantage of M4P is that it forces 
these roles to be justified transparently and provides a platform 




The above arguments illustrate the relevance of M4P to the 
financial services market. M4P provides value first by offering 
clarity in analysis – a transparent means through which 
governments and development agencies can examine the overall 
market system and their own role in developing it. And second, 
given this clarity, by providing guidance for interventions.
M4P does not provide any unique insights into the many detailed 
technical debates in financial services relating to, for example, 
the specifics of regulations or of information requirements. It 
does, however, present a strategic framework within which 
these technical analyses can take place and within which they 
can be used. Moreover, since M4P is currently being used 
successfully in financial services market development in a variety 
of places, there is increasingly strong evidence for its relevance 
and applicability.
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this paper focuses on the application of M4P to labour 
markets. It first establishes the importance of labour markets 
to growth and poverty reduction. It then discusses a number 
of key issues in developing labour markets and views these 
through the ‘lens’ of M4P.  in doing so it outlines the value of 
M4P in relation to clarity of analysis in complex markets and 
shaping more pro-poor labour market outcomes. 
importance and relevance to the poor
Labour is an important factor of production and labour force 
quality is recognised to be a vital determinant of competitiveness 
and growth: “labour force quality has a consistent, stable, and strong 
relationship with economic growth”.1 The relationship is a virtuous 
one: a quality labour force is an ingredient of competitiveness 
and growth, and growth provides the resources and incentives 
for societies, firms and individuals to invest in labour quality.
Strong global GDP growth (5.2% worldwide in 2007) has led to 
an increase in people in work a:  3bn people aged 15 years and 
above are estimated to be in work, a 1.6% increase from 2006 
and a 17.4% increase since 1997, with Asia accounting for the 
majority of this increase. Productivity levels have been increasing 
more than employment levels. The global unemployment rate in 
2007 remained constant at 6%.2
Labour is the principal asset of most poor people.3 one way in 
which the poor can benefit from pro-poor growth is through 
their participation in the labour market. For many agencies 
therefore, overriding concerns are whether the poor have 
access to some form of employment and, consequently, the 
ability of developing countries to absorb growing numbers of 
new entrants into the labour market. For example, between 
2005 and 2015 an estimated 106 million new entrants will join 
the rural labour force alone.4 
However, developed countries’ preoccupation with levels of 
unemployment in their own countries does not accurately 
reflect the reality of employment conditions in developing 
countries. Lacking the comprehensive welfare provision and 
social safety nets of developed countries, the poor cannot afford 
to be unemployed. They tend to be ‘underemployed’b: the poor 
pursue a diversity of economic activities – often informal – in 
order to secure a livelihood. A key challenge for agencies is to 
understand how the poor participate in labour markets which 
differ markedly from those in developed countries (and even 
between and within individual developing countries). 
Currently the ‘working poor’, ie those who do not earn 
sufficient to lift themselves above the US$1 a day poverty line, 
are estimated by the International Labour organisation (ILo) 
to number 486.7 million globally. over one billion do not earn 
enough to lift themselves above the US$2 a day line. 
A second area of concern for agencies is the terms of the poor’s 
participation in labour markets. These are concerned with, inter 
alia: levels of remuneration (eg minimum wages), working 
conditions (eg working hours, health and safety conditions), 
security of tenure (eg regulations concerning dismissal) and 
access to mechanisms for representation and redress (eg 
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rights of organisation and collective bargaining), as well as the 
elimination of forced and child labour. Most notably these are 
encapsulated in the notion of “decent work” promulgated by 
the ILo. whilst most governments and agencies support core 
labour standards in principle, there is frequent disagreement 
about the extent to which they can be applied and enforced 
universally within labour markets in developing countries, and 
the effects of their application on access to employment and on 
economic growth. 
A final consideration for agencies seeking to promote more 
effective labour markets for the poor is the changing ‘world 
of work’. Increasing levels of globalisation or integration, rapid 
technical progress and changing demographic trends impact on 
the way labour markets work around the world. As a result, 
patterns of work are emerging which differ considerably from 
the long-held ideal of formal life-long employment. These 
changes place new demands on labour, in terms of skills, mobility 
and adaptability. Agencies and governments are challenged to 
better understand the complexity of labour markets: the fact 
that there is no such thing as a homogenous labour market; the 
interconnection between labour markets and markets for other 
factors, goods and services; and – most critically – how the poor 
participate in labour markets. 
It is not possible to cover such complexity within this short paper. 
Its focus therefore is on summarising key challenges in labour 
market development and the M4P perspective on them.
key challenges in developing labour markets
 
The centrality of labour markets to people’s livelihoods means 
that agencies and governments are confronted with a number of 
issues which can often be politically sensitive. These sensitivities 
can sometimes influence judgement and action. 
M4P aims to bring impartiality to these difficult issues and to 
offer improved clarity in analysis and guidance for shaping more 
pro-poor labour market outcomes. This typically means:
l a better understanding of labour markets and reasons for the 
 poor’s exclusion or disadvantaged position;
l stronger recognition of derived demand for labour and 
 interconnected markets;
l a transparent and more pluralistic view of the labour market 
 system, incorporating a greater diversity of functions and 
 players, to enhance regulation, skills, information, mobility 
 and representation in a manner that is suitable for developing 
 country contexts. 
rural and urban labour markets and the migration ‘problem’ 
Poverty is typically regarded as a rural problem. The poorest 
countries are predominantly agrarian and 75% of the world’s 
poor live in rural areas (883m people at US$1 a day poverty 
level). Therefore, rural labour markets – and within this, 
agriculture – have historically been regarded as important for 
agencies and governments. Growth in agriculture is believed 
to be – on average – at least twice as effective in reducing 
poverty as growth outside agriculture. Agricultural growth 
reduces poverty directly, by raising farm incomes, and indirectly, 
by generating employment and reducing food prices.5 
The reality of agriculture in developing countries is that annual 
returns per worker rarely exceed US$750 (gross, before input 
costs).6 Deshingkar and Farrington estimate that in South Asia, 
while agricultural labour underpins rural livelihoods, it is only 
available for two to three months a year.7
Agriculture is therefore only one part of the story of rural labour 
markets. Non-farm rural employmentc typically accounts for 
between 20% and 50% of employment and 20-90% of income 
in developing countries.8 In Bangladesh between 1987 and 2000 
the proportion of workers involved directly in agriculture halved 
in response to greater rural non-farm opportunities.9 Therefore 
rural labour markets are about a mixture of agriculture and 
non-farm livelihood activities.
The other significant dynamic in rural labour markets is migration. 
Limited agricultural returns, combined with new opportunities 
as a result of improved infrastructure and communications, have 
marked rises in migration. For example, in China rural–urban 
migrants increased from 26m in 1998 to 126m in 2004. The 
patterns of migration have also changed: there is a slowing of 
permanent migration and increasing levels of temporary or 
‘circular’ migration. In Bangladesh 10% of rural migrants go to 
other rural areas, less than 25% to other countries and 66% to 
urban areas. Most of these return to their villages at the end of 
the working season; 80% of income is derived from outside the 
village. In Andhra Pradesh in India 40% of villagers commute 
daily to urban centres.10
Although rural poverty rates tend to be substantially higher 
than urban rates, it is increasingly recognised that poverty is 
not solely a rural phenomenon. UN-HABITAT estimates that 
between 2000 and 2030 2bn people will be added to urban 
areas of developing countries. Africa is experiencing the world’s 
most rapid rate of urbanisation.
In this context, the ability of urban labour markets to absorb 
swelling urban populations is a key concern for agencies and 
government. Consequently, they have frequently sought to 
limit migration on the one hand and stimulate employment 
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d It is estimated that every hectare of cultivated land adds an average of 16% to annual household income. every month of migrant labour adds an average of 7% to annual household income p.a.  
 That is to say, two months of migrant labour is equivalent to the contribution of one hectare of cultivated land (the average land-holding of migrant households). e Very poor households, however, may continue with a level of agricultural activity even if its productivity is low and higher potential non-farm opportunities are available, as a means of ensuring food security.
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on the other, through active labour market programmes 
(such as training, public works programmes, micro-enterprise 
development, job subsidies and job search assistance schemes) 
in both rural and urban labour markets. However, evaluations 
show that “it is extremely difficult to address problems of large 
scale unemployment through active labour market programmes”. If 
such programmes are to be effective they have to be targeted to 
specific groups on the basis of strong analysis. even so, pay-offs 
tend to be modest: job search assistance or employment 
services appear to be more cost-effective than other labour 
market interventions.11
The M4P perspective: building support functions to expand 
choice
M4P recognises the importance of a perspective which looks 
beyond labour markets. Demand for labour of the poor is 
essentially derived from the demand for goods and services 
they are involved in producing and is linked to the performance 
of the wider economy. The labour market is also closely related 
to other factor markets, such as land and finance. Consequently, 
the labour market’s poverty-reducing effects are inseparable 
from the effectiveness of measures to improve the wider 
economy and to strengthen pro-poor growth patterns in both 
rural and urban contexts.
Most significantly, this means that M4P interventions are often 
indirect: initiatives to strengthen other factor and product 
markets in turn impact on the operation of labour markets. 
Market choice and analysis is crucial therefore. In pursuing 
market development strategies governments and agencies need 
to identify markets with pro-poor opportunities and ensure 
that their interventions do not unduly encourage unwarranted 
substitution of capital for labour. 
employment patterns in agriculture are not homogenous. For 
crops or livestock which require ample land, farmers typically 
rely on family labour because the supervision cost of hired 
labour is often too high. Conversely, those that require less land 
are more amenable to factory-style operations and tend to see 
higher levels of hired employees, eg horticulture, floriculture, 
aquaculture, pigs and poultry. There is greater scope for 
employment generation in these higher productivity activities. 
Strengthening non-farm markets and links between rural and 
urban areas are also of critical importance. Processing, trading, 
distribution and other ancillary services, such as transportation, 
are important to raise agricultural productivity, but are also a 
source of employment in their own right. A key priority of M4P 
intervention is often these kinds of supporting functions around 
core agricultural markets.
Another key area of focus stems from the recognition that 
migration is inevitable and important. Interventions are required 
to strengthen market functions which can enable migration, 
not artificially restrict it. Migrant labour is a compensating 
mechanism used by disadvantaged households and is a vital 
dimension of addressing rural poverty. For example, the daily 
wage of a migrant worker in India is between 47% and 76% 
higher than wages in their village of origin.12 In Bangladesh the 
proportion of families receiving remittances in 1999-2000 was 
21%; in 1987-88 it was only 11%.d  13
Migration can also free up agricultural markets. It allows those 
who are less willing or able to pursue productive agriculture 
to move into alternative livelihoods, releasing resources for 
those who are more motivated or capable. For example, Afsar 
identifies a link between migrant remittances, land purchases 
and levels of land tenancies; migration stimulates land tenancy, 
providing additional access to land for land-poor households.e
The emphasis of M4P intervention is to recognise that for poor 
people their livelihoods are often multi-locational. The capacity 
of the poor to shift livelihoods is therefore critical and evidence 
suggests that networks and contacts are critical to achieving 
this. According to Deshingkar and Farrington, interventions 
therefore need to ensure that people have “an environment 
where they can make choices” rather than clinging to own-account 
production in situ, which has often been the implicit focus of 
rural development: “mobility needs to be supported through the 
development of migrant-friendly services”. 
M4P intervention priorities (Box 1) include: mechanisms to 
reduce the costs and risks faced by migrants (eg information, 
transportation, insurance and tenancy); ensuring entitlements to 
state services are portable; and promoting the efficiency and 
security of income remittances. These interventions must be 
complemented by significant improvements in rural education 
to enable the transition into more skill-intensive employment 
and successful migration.
Box 1
Interventions consistent with M4P priorities
For example, China has now removed requirements for 
migrants to have permits to move to cities and Vietnam has 
eased its registration rules. In India mobile ration cards are being 
piloted in rajasthan whilst in Madhya Pradesh, DFID is funding 
a migrant support programme to enhance information about 
work opportunities and improve skills to increase migrants’ 
bargaining power.
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Dualistic labour markets
Labour markets in developing countries are commonly believed 
to be dualistic. They are segmented between those workers in 
formal employment enjoying high wages and benefits mandated 
by legislation and those employed informally who lack job 
security and related benefits. The latter category includes (a) the 
self-employed; (b) waged workers working for informal firms; 
and (c) contract workers who do not receive a regular wage 
but are paid on commission or percentage, piece rate or fixed 
contract. 
The informal sector is typically characterised in terms of its 
ease of entry and exit, its reliance on indigenous resources, 
family-operated enterprises, small scale, labour intensity, use of 
adapted technology, skills acquired outside the classroom and 
non-compliance with regulations. Concerns about the informal 
sector tend to centre on the issues of the ‘protectedness’ of 
workers and the size and legality of employers.
A key debate is the extent to which the informal sector is 
merely a mechanism – like a sponge – for absorbing residual 
labour which cannot find work in the formal sector, or whether 
it is an efficient and dynamic sector in which workers choose 
to participate.
l The sponge argument is that in developing countries the rapidly 
 expanding labour force cannot be wholly absorbed by the more 
 productive and remunerative formal sector and consequently 
 workers end up in the informal sector as a last resort. This 
 results in pronounced ‘insider-outsider’ segmentation: for two 
 similar employees, the insider in formal employment will 
 receive a comparatively higher wage (and benefits) than the 
 outsider in the informal sector.  
l The alternative view is that the informal sector is a dynamic 
 source of entrepreneurship. There are sound reasons for 
 workers to prefer informal employment in the face of 
 inefficiency and rigidity in the formal sector. restrictive labour 
 regulations and taxes raise the cost of entry to the formal 
 sector; low levels of education and productivity in the formal 
 sector depress earnings. Consequently the opportunity cost of 
 being informally employed is reduced. research14 from 
 Mexico found that 60-70% of the informally self-employed 
 preferred their status to formal employment as it brought 
 them greater independence and higher earnings: “Earnings 
 differential and patterns of mobility are consistent with much 
 of the informal sector being a desirable destination and with 
 the distinct modalities of work being relatively well integrated. 
 There is little evidence to support the traditional dualistic view 
 as the principal paradigm through which informality should be 
 viewed.”15
Government and agency responses have tended to focus on 
formalising the informal sector, often through prohibition of 
informal activity and support for formalisation. However there 
is no clear evidence that increasing or decreasing formalisation 
improves or worsens the welfare of the poor.
The M4P perspective: reducing segmentation and increasing 
mobility
The M4P perspective is that informality is a reality. The 
informal sector accounts for over half of employment in many 
developing countries. The bulk of new employment has come 
from the informal sector, with women accounting for 60-80% 
of informal sector employment. The informal sector “is not a 
transitory phenomenon in the development process... it is recognised 
that formal and informal sectors will cohabit and are very much 
interlinked in subtle and complicated ways.”16
Formality and informality co-exist in different proportions 
in different countries and within countries. Different sets of 
institutions can create different types of informality, encompassing 
that which is voluntary and involuntary and workers of diverse 
calibres in terms of occupation, skills and remuneration.
The priority focus of M4P intervention is to reduce exclusion 
by strengthening labour market systems to provide the poor 
with choice, mobility and capacity to build their livelihoods in 
response to a changing spectrum of opportunity. 
M4P’s starting point is understanding the dynamics, institutions 
and incentives of specific labour markets and the nature of the 
poor’s livelihoods within those labour markets (and markets 
connected with them). In particular, to differentiate between 
the symptoms and causes of informality and segmentation, and 
investigate whether segmentation results in outcomes which are 
suboptimal for the poor. 
Labour market analysis and information is therefore critical to 
this objective, but typically lacking in developing countries. This 
inhibits effective decision-making by policy-makers, employers 
and workers. For example, labour force surveys tend to assess 
primary occupation only and ignore secondary activities in the 
informal sector. M4P intervention is based on realistic analysis 
of labour markets, but also seeks to improve the ability of the 
market system to conduct appropriate labour market research 
and information provision in the future – ie, a supporting 
function of the market.
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More specifically, this means understanding: 
l Market dynamics: In particular labour force growth relative to 
 economic growth. If the proportion of formal sector 
 workforce is increasing as a proportion of total workforce as 
 a result of growth, the proportion of the labour force engaged 
 in involuntary ‘sponge’ informal activities declines, leaving 
 a more vibrant and productive informal sector intact 
 and reducing segmentation. Conversely, if formal sector 
 employment is reducing as a proportion of overall workforce, 
 involuntary informal activity increases to absorb a growing 
 residual labour force, increasing segmentation.f
l Underlying causes of segmentation and its effects on the poor. 
 Segmentation may arise for a number of reasons:
  - State support. For example urban workers in China, usually 
   employed in state and collective sectors, have preferential 
   status as a result of restrictive residents’ registration laws 
   which restricts competition from rural migrants.
  - organised workers. For example in South Africa, organised 
   labour is powerful as a result of strong links between 
   political parties and trades unions. The union premium on 
   wages is high and has risen in spite of rising unemployment. 
   Informal sector wages are approximately 60% of those in 
   the formal sector. Similarly, the wages of private sector 
   teachers in India are approximately half of (politically 
   powerful) public sector teachers, despite evidence that 
   private teachers are more effective in terms of higher 
   academic results achieved.g
  - economic forces. Larger firms, due to their managerial style 
   or technology employed in production, require committed, 
   quality workers and can pay a premium, often reinforced by 
   their monopsonistic power in the labour market.
  - Distribution of political influence. Urban residents typically 
   earn more, partly as a result of better opportunities, but also 
   as a result of stronger political voice.
l Incentives: The relative costs and returns of participating 
 in the formal sector versus those of informal sector activity. 
 evidence suggests that higher calibre workers tend to enter 
 the informal sector voluntarily and get higher returns in the 
 informal sector than in the formal sector. Lower calibre workers 
 tend to be involuntarily employed in the informal sector as a 
 result of market segmentation. For example, in Brazil there is 
 high mobility between sectors: 50% of informal workers in any 
 given year will be formally employed the following year.
The focus of M4P intervention is not to support blanket 
formalisation of the informal sector. Intervention needs to be 
driven by a clear understanding of why specific labour markets 
 
are not working for the poor ; in particular, the efficiency of 
labour markets and the extent to which informal activity is 
voluntary or involuntary. A key priority is to reduce labour 
market segmentation and increase mobility by reducing the 
costs of entry into the formal sector rather than penalising 
informality with a view to reducing it. In addition to improving 
labour market research and information, this may entail 
strengthening market system functions which assist in enabling 
mobility and graduation towards formality: for example, 
recognising informal associations and promoting access to 
functions or facilities, such as property tenure, which can serve 
as stepping stones to formal recognition.
Security versus flexibility
Perhaps the most polarised debate in relation to labour 
markets is centred on the issues of security of employment and 
the flexibility of the workforce. In an increasingly competitive 
and integrated world, there is pressure on economies, firms 
and their workforces to be as flexible and efficient as possible. 
An excessively regulated or rigid labour market is regarded 
as inhibitive to competitiveness (see, for example, the world 
Bank’s Doing Business assessments).17 Conversely, there is 
a concern that the rights and conditions of workers have 
been eroded as a result of global competition and excessive 
deregulation of labour markets (see, for example, the ILo’s 
critique of the Doing Business indicators).18
Conventionally, ‘pro-labour’ interventions have focused on 
the ratification of core labour standards by developing 
countries and their incorporation into employment protection 
legislation. This is often accompanied by large-scale information 
campaigns to raise awareness and support to organised labour. 
‘Pro-business’ interventions focus on support to developing 
country governments to conduct regulatory analysis and 
reform aimed at streamlining employment protection and 
liberalising the labour market.
The M4P perspective: alternative ways to improve standards
Sharply divided ideological debates tend not to deliver 
benefits to the poor. reality is inevitably more nuanced. The 
M4P approach is concerned with the effectiveness of markets. 
Inappropriate regulation is often a cause of market outcomes 
which do not serve the poor, but improving those markets 
does not always mean deregulation: it often means better 
regulation. equally, M4P recognises that labour is important to 
the poor and is concerned with improving the poor’s access to 
labour markets and their terms of engagement within labour 
markets. However, in weak market situations it is not always 
possible or desirable to impose labour standards in a formulaic 
manner.
f examples and data are from ruffer & Knight, 2007. 
g This is also an example of a different manifestation of the insider-outsider problem: protection of (relatively well-off) workers at the cost of affordable or appropriate goods and services for (poorer)  
 consumers. 
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The main concern of M4P is to promote access to employment 
and overcome exclusion as a result of insider-outsider problems. 
In developing countries a characteristic of many markets with 
protective legislation is that they often favour insiders at the cost 
of outsiders. These markets tend to deliver favourable terms to 
the minority to the detriment of the majority, an advantage that 
is vociferously defended by the privileged (and often powerful) 
minority. Parallels can be drawn with the provision of water : 
supply to the formal and middle-income sectors is subsidised 
whilst the informal and poor pay substantially more per unit 
consumed. Some forms of labour market regulation can have 
this characteristic.
For example, unemployment in Croatia is high and rising; in 
the 15-24 age group the unemployment rate is over 40%. The 
problem is symptomatic of slow job creation, which in turn is a 
manifestation of barriers to entry to new firms and expansion 
of existing firms. Strict employment protection legislation (ePL) 
increases the cost of formal sector labour and job creation is 
slowed by uncompetitive unit labour costs. ePL in Croatia is 
much stricter than in countries with flexible labour markets 
(and low unemployment), such as Hungary. relatively high 
wages are not explained by higher productivity or by payroll 
taxes. They result from wage pressure exerted by insiders – 
workers with protected, secure jobs and in a strong bargaining 
position – employed in large state-owned or privatised 
enterprises. By inhibiting job turnover, strict ePL hinders 
productivity improvements and ‘protects’ existing employees at 
the expense of the continual stream of new entrants into the 
labour market.19
Clearly, poor working conditions and exploitation are 
prevalent in developing countries. An M4P approach challenges 
governments and agencies to understand why those conditions 
exist and think realistically about how they can be addressed. 
This partly entails assessing the extent to which regulation 
actually achieves objectives of promoting access to better work 
for the majority. Intervention should support labour standards 
and codes of practice whose direct and indirect effects are 
understood and carefully judged from a pro-poor perspective. 
M4P recognises that in most developing countries only a small 
proportion of workers are formally organised and protected h 20 
and the capacity of government to enforce employment 
protection legislation, even when it exists in the statute books, is 
often limited. It is not simply a question of importing standards 
and practices from developed economies.
M4P seeks to promote ‘right-sized’ solutions which offer better 
prospects for effective and sustainable implementation and which 
might serve as stepping stones towards more sophisticated 
labour market regulation in future.
These might focus on improving accountability and transparency 
in labour markets and raising awareness of workers’ rights 
through non-regulatory mechanisms. This might entail trying 
to change the mindsets of employers and their representatives 
(including the informal sector) about the business case for 
better employment conditions, or strengthening workers’ 
representatives organisations (again, including the informal). 
However it might also focus on developing supporting functions 
such as information provision, advocacy and scrutiny by third 
parties, for example the media (Box 2).
Box 2
improving labour market functioning by media development
In 2003 British American Tobacco (BAT) faced a major problem 
with its outgrowing scheme in Uganda. More than 25,000 small-
scale farmers were producing increasingly poor quality and yields. 
what BAT’s senior management in their Kampala headquarters 
did not know was that the relationship between farmers and 
BAT buyers in the field had broken down completely. 
Farmers accused the buyers of widespread rent-seeking that 
reduced their incomes, making tobacco an unprofitable crop. 
Farmers were opting out of tobacco growing, potentially 
destroying a supply chain vital to the incomes of rural 
communities.
A local commercial radio station uncovered and investigated 
the story. It ran and recorded a village-based debate on the 
issue. Despite threats of violence from local BAT buyers the 
station persevered and ran a series of programmes on the issue. 
The station followed up the story by travelling to Kampala and 
presenting its findings to BAT’s senior managers. Their response 
was immediate. An enquiry was undertaken and within a year 
BAT had restructured its operations, in the process making the 
majority of its field staff redundant. BAT altered its policy on 
communications, investing in local radio as a means of both 
conveying information to their outgrowers and providing 
platforms to allow the outgrowers to discuss issues and 
problems. Interest in tobacco growing has been rejuvenated, 
with farmers tripling the income they make from tobacco. The 
number of outgrowers has increased to 47,000 and tobacco 
quality has risen.21
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skills development
In the modern world of work, skills are regarded as a passport to 
success – people are required to work smarter, not just harder. 
workers need to be flexible, adaptable and mobile, which 
means that they need to acquire and maintain skills throughout 
the course of their working life – ‘life-long learning’.  education 
systems in developing countries, however, have struggled to keep 
up with this need for dynamism, in terms of relevance to the 
needs of the labour market as well as achieving the coverage 
that expanding labour forces require.
A conventional response has been to see this as a problem 
of scarce resources. Improving education, it is argued, requires 
massive increases in public funding. Agencies have provided 
billions of dollars to developing countries to fund education (the 
Commission for Africa recommends US$7-8bn per year). Some 
observers are concerned about the efficacy of this approach, 
partly in terms of the long-term sustainability of finance and 
partly because funding per se does not necessarily lead to 
reform and performance improvements in education systems. 
“The accepted wisdom is wrong. It ignores the reality that poor 
parents are abandoning public schools en mass, to send their children 
to ’budget’ private schools that charge low fees – perhaps one or two 
dollars per month, affordable even to parents on poverty-line wages. 
In the shanty towns of Lagos, Nigeria, for example, or the poor, rural 
areas surrounding Accra, Ghana, or the slums of Hyderabad, India, 
the majority of schoolchildren – between 64 and 75 per cent – are 
enrolled in private schools. Even in remote areas of China, huge 
numbers of private schools exist off the official radar.” 22
Tooley’s research indicates that these private schools for the 
poor are superior to government schools: teachers are more 
likely to be teaching when called upon unannounced in their 
classrooms; private schools are generally better equipped with 
drinking water and toilets; academic achievement (based on 
testing of 24,000 children) is much higher, at a fraction of the 
per-pupil teacher cost. Teacher’s salaries – the largest recurrent 
expense of most schools – are approximately a quarter to a 
third lower in private schools than in government schools.
Similarly, there are concerns about the coverage, relevance 
and sustainability of systems for vocational skills development 
(ie post-school education). Many existing systems are failing to 
serve large parts of the potential labour force, particularly young 
people, the disadvantaged and the informal sector, or to equip 
workers for the new realities of work. For example, the oeCD’s 
2008 African economic outlook 23 surveyed 35 countries and 
found that formal “technical and vocational skills development 
systems in Africa suffer from a shortage of qualified staff, obsolete 
equipment, ill-adapted programmes and weak links with the job 
market. Very few countries emphasise skills development in the 
informal sector, the largest employer and source of training in 
Africa.” 24 The research also indicates that private sector training 
and, particularly traditional apprenticeship in the informal sector, 
predominates: the formal system typically accounts for less than 
5% of trainees.
reforms of vocational skills development are partly inhibited 
by ideological concerns. As with mainstream education, in spite 
of emerging realities on the ground many view education as a 
universal ‘right’ which should always be publicly provided, not 
entrusted to the private sector.  
There is also a perceived tension between ‘quality’ and ‘quantity’. 
Conventional vocational skills development systems have 
been geared to comprehensive and intensive courses, usually 
of a lengthy duration, academically oriented and delivered by 
formal public training centres (usually in urban areas), of ‘high 
quality’ and often modelled on developed country models. 
The outreach – ‘quantity’ – of such courses is limited by their 
cost and public budget constraints. There is a concern that in 
seeking to expand access to vocational skills courses quality is 
diluted. 
The M4P perspective: exploring better public–private alignment 
of roles
The M4P perspective is that a heterogeneous workforce 
cannot be served by a homogenous system of education 
delivery. reforming skills development systems so that they 
work better for poor people means stimulating systems to 
become more pluralistic, decentralised and responsive to the 
demands of the labour market and to offer different products 
relevant to the requirements of different user groups, through 
diversified delivery systems and more appropriate mechanisms 
for certification, governance and finance. This typically entails 
government shifting from a comprehensive role as legislator, 
standard setter, curriculum setter, financier and monopoly 
provider to a more focused role, establishing the framework 
for service provision, ensuring standards and providing targeted 
finance to the most disadvantaged groups.
The first challenge is understanding how specific labour markets 
work, and how vocational skills systems need to meet the needs 
of those labour markets more effectively and better serve poor 
people in – or potentially in – those labour markets.
This means understanding the informal sector. Poor people in 
the informal sector need skills, but their pattern of work and the 
way they learn is often different from those in formal education 
or employment. Poor people cannot devote lengthy periods of 
time to full-time learning; they often need to study after they 
have completed a full day’s work or at intermittent intervals. 
Moreover, poor people often acquire skills on the job, which are 
not recognised by formal systems of occupational certification.  
Based on this understanding, a variety of different functions 
need to be reformed and players re-aligned (Box 3):
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l Product development needs to be ‘right-sized’ to better 
 reflect the needs of poor people. This doesn’t mean a reduction 
 in quality per se, but it does mean courses which are less 
 academically oriented and structured more flexibly to reflect 
 different patterns of work and styles of learning: for example, 
 modular courses offered outside normal working hours. work 
 placements are also important.
l Delivery needs to be decentralised and diversified. Flexibility 
 and close engagement with employers is not easily achieved 
 within rigid public sector hierarchies. Increased levels of localised 
 service delivery, which permits autonomy and accountability 
 to users (students and employers) are essential. This is often 
 achieved through greater private sector provision, be that for- 
 profit or non-profit. Increased choice and competition between 
 training providers is usually desirable.
l Certification of skill needs a more competency-based 
 approach, assessing and certifying skills acquired on the job, 
 rather than relying on completion of formal courses.
l Coordination mechanisms which bring together employers, 
 service providers, workers’ representatives and governments 
 to identify critical skills gaps and enhance the relevance of skills 
 development to the labour market.
l Standards and quality control. The public nature of education 
 requires that government set an appropriate framework 
 of standards, performance benchmarks, measurement and 
 information provision, to allow users to scrutinise service 
 providers.
l Diversification and innovation in finance. reforming and 
 extending skills development systems inevitably demands 
 additional resources: it is necessary to expand resources 
 within the skills development system. M4P is careful to 
 distinguish between temporary, transitional costs and recurrent 
 costs. It may be legitimate for agencies to contribute to the 
 transitional costs of reform but if agencies cover recurrent 
 costs, sustainability problems are likely to be encountered. 
 recurrent costs need to be met within the system. Given public 
 funding constraints, this typically means increasing contributions 
 from users (students and employers) and other forms of 
 revenue-raising by autonomous service providers. Government 
 may need to continue to provide some form of finance for 
 delivery, particularly for the most disadvantaged, but do so in 
 a more targeted way – eg vouchers – to build their sovereignty 
 as consumers over a choice of service providers.
Box 3
reforming the vocational education system in Peru
In Peru, government recognised that it couldn’t expand outreach 
in its vocational education system to disadvantaged groups with 
its existing monolithic structure. A more autonomous and multi-
party system was required, encompassing service providers, 
service users, employers and government. 
The Ministry of education permitted a pilot initiative 
implemented by an SDC-funded project to test a different 
approach. Government training centres were given greater 
autonomy to deliver training and to pursue revenue-raising 
activities, creating incentives for centre managers and students 
alike. Governing bodies were established for training centres 
which included representatives of local industry, workers and 
civil society. A recruitment search and placement function was 
also developed within centres, which required the participation 
of the Ministry of Labour.
The existing vertical hierarchy was transformed to a more 
decentralised structure, incorporating a network of autonomous 
training centres, with centres supported by the project 
encouraged to support other centres across the country. 
Government’s role in the system was more narrowly focused 
on standard setting, coordination and finance.
After eight initial pilot training centres, another 60 centres 
adopted the approach and a further 200 initiated reforms along 
similar lines. Post-training employment rate of students (300,000 
trained per year) increased from 28% to 53%.  Job placement 
was also a success, with 100,000 placement requests a year, 
75% of which were matched. The successful pilot became the 
blueprint for the Ministry of education’s reform of the vocational 
skills development system.25
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summary
Because labour is the key asset of the poor, for M4P to be generally 
relevant to the lives of poor people it is vital that is has application and 
utility in relation to how they can use their labour more effectively 
in labour markets. The above arguments illustrate the relevance of 
M4P to the labour market and the general ways in which it can 
offer value, first by offering clarity in analysis – a transparent means 
through which governments and agencies can examine the overall 
market system and their own role in developing it – and second by 
providing guidance for interventions.
More specifically, M4P offers insight into how steps can be taken 
to build support functions, to reduce segmentation and increase 
mobility, to use alternative means of improving standards and to 
explore improved alignment of public–private roles in the labour 
market system. examples show the types of benefits that can be 
achieved by utilising the M4P approach and the potential for further 
large-scale change from more widespread application.
references 
1  Hanushek, e & Kimko, D (1995); Schooling, Labor-Force Quality, and the Growth of Nations; NBer working Paper No. 5399
2  ILo (2008); Global Employment Trends; ILo, Geneva
3  world Bank (1990); World Development Report; washington
4  wiggens, S & Deshingkar, P (2007); Rural employment and migration: In search of decent work; oDI Briefing Paper No. 27
5  world Bank (2008); World Development Report; washington
6  wiggens & Deshingkar (2007)
7  Deshingkar, P & Farrington, J (2006); Rural labour markets and migration in South Asia: Evidence from India and Bangladesh; Background 
  Paper for the world Development report 2008,overseas Development Institute
8  Gordon, A & Craig, C (2001); Rural Non-Farm Activities and Poverty Alleviation In Sub-Saharan Africa; Natural resources   
  Institute, University of Greenwich
9  Afsar, r (2003); Internal migration and the development nexus: the case of Bangladesh; Bangladesh Institute of Development 
  Studies
10 wiggens & Deshingkar (2007)
11 Dar, A & Tzannatos, Z (1999); Active Labor Market Programs: A Review of the Evidence from Evaluations; Social Protection 
  Department, world Bank, washington
12 Deshingkar & Farrington (2006)
13 Afsar (2003)
14 Maloney, w (2004); Informality Revisited; world Development, Vol. 32 Issue 7, 2004
15 Maloney, w (2004); Are LDC Labor Markets Dualistic?; world Bank, washington
16 ruffer, T & Knight, J (2007); Informal Sector Labour Markets in Developing Countries; oxford Policy Management, DFID, London
17 world Bank; Doing Business;  http://www.doingbusiness.org/ 
18 Berg, J & Cazes, S (2007); The Doing Business Indicators: Measurement issues and political implications; economic & Labour Market 
  Analysis Department, ILo, Geneva
19 rutkowski, J (2003); Does Strict Employment Protection Discourage Job Creation? - Evidence from Croatia; Policy research working 
  Paper No. 3104, world Bank, washington
20 Bhorat, H, Lundall, P, rospabe, S (2003); The South African Labour Market in a Globalizing World: Economic and Legislative Considerations; 
  employment paper 32, ILo, Geneva
21 Anderson, G & elliott, D (2007); The role and impact of radio in reforming the rural business environment in Africa; Fauno working 
  paper, employment & Income Division, SDC, Berne
22 Tooley, J (2006); Low-Cost Schools in Poor Nations Seek investors; Financial Times, 17 September 2006
23 oeCD (2008); African Economic Outlook 2008; oeCD, Paris
24 oeCD (2008); Investing in Africa’s Youth; Policy Insights No. 62, oeCD Development Centre, Paris
25 Schlegel, w (2006); CAPLAB – A Training for Employment Programme in Peru; Fauno working Paper, employment and Income 
  Division, SDC, Berne
PAPer 3: M4P AND LABoUr
25

Perspectives on the Making Markets work for the Poor (M4P) Approach
r
introduction 
this paper focuses on the relevance and application of M4P 
to land market reform. land is a complex issue. it often goes 
to the root of social, political and economic structures and 
processes. It is an emotive issue with deep psychological 
resonance for many. land is central to the livelihoods of the 
poor, and central therefore to the poverty reduction challenge. 
this paper considers the role land plays in the livelihood 
strategies and outcomes of the poor. in this context, it then 
concentrates on three specific dimensions: access, security of 
tenure, and interconnectedness with other market systems. 
the relevance and application of M4P is explored at each 
juncture.
importance and relevance to the poor
economic growth is faster in countries where the initial 
distribution of land is more equally shared, and growth tends to 
accelerate and be more inclusive when people can access land 
fairly and efficiently, and when land tenure is secure. Put simply, 
land is fundamental to the livelihood strategies of the poor. 
Three-quarters of the world’s poor live in rural areas and are 
largely dependent on agriculture, whether for subsistence or 
sale. Access to land, and conditions that determine access, 
strongly influence the returns in agriculture, which in turn is 
the key factor in determining livelihood outcomes. Agricultural 
growth and poverty reduction depend significantly on increasing 
agricultural productivity. There is widespread evidence that, 
whether a tenure system is communal or individual, freehold or 
leasehold, farmers are more likely to invest in their land – and 
achieve productivity gains – when they have secure land rights.
Land is not only a key determinant of household welfare; it often 
constitutes the main element in households’ asset portfolios. In 
Uganda, for example, land is estimated to constitute 50-60% of 
the total asset endowment of the poorest households.1 Labour 
is the other main asset of the poor. Those households with 
access to land are generally better placed to make the most 
productive use of their labour. 
For land reform to have a significant impact on poverty 
reduction it must be part of a broader process of political, 
social and economic change, rather than a narrow intervention 
simply to redistribute land (Box 1). The pace of land reform 
cannot reasonably run ahead of advances in other related areas, 
especially the provision of infrastructure (water, power and 
communications) and services to small-scale farmers (credit, 
input supply, marketing and adaptive research). Nor can it run 
ahead of the capacity of governments to play appropriate roles 
in different, related market systems.
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Box 1
linking land rights to agricultural reform and rural 
development 2
The poor can only realise the benefits of more equal land 
distribution and secure land tenure if they can also participate 
in wider development through:
l better access to input and product markets, including savings 
 and credit;
l appropriate technologies for higher, sustainable productivity;
l education and the skills to use the new technologies;
l opportunities to diversify both within and beyond 
 agriculture;
l for the landless, being able to access land;
l improved tenancy and sharecropping arrangements;
l protection of rights and development of opportunities for 
 agricultural workers;
l equitable opportunities for private sector development, eg in 
 high-value crops for export;
l better terms of trade for developing country agricultural 
 producers.
key challenges in developing land markets: the M4P 
perspective
Given the breadth and complexity of issues linking land, 
livelihoods, growth and poverty a comprehensive discussion is 
beyond the scope of this paper. The focus here, therefore, is on 
summarising key challenges in land market development, and 
the M4P perspective on these:
l access to land;
l security of land tenure; and 
l the interconnectedness between land and other markets.
access to land
Patterns of land allocation affect the efficiency and growth of 
agricultural production. Figure 1 confirms that between 1960 
and 2000, countries that had a more equal distribution of land 
tended to be characterised by higher levels of economic growth. 
This fact, combined with the social and political importance of 
land, has motivated governments in countries where, often for 
historical reasons, access to land was highly unequal, to intervene 
in the functioning of markets through land reforms that aimed 
to equalise the ownership distribution of land.
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figure 1
Initial land distribution and economic growth, selected countries (average GDP growth, 1960-2000) 3

































































note on figure 1:
GDP = Gross Domestic Product. Land distribution 
is measured using the Gini Index – a widely used 
measure of inequality that ranges from 0 
(perfect equality) to 1 (perfect inequality).
Source: Deininger (2003)
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Interventionist land reform involves the transfer of ownership 
from a ruling class to tenant workers. Hence, it is not surprising 
that most large-scale land reforms are associated with revolts 
(Bolivia), revolutions (Chile, China, Cuba, el Salvador, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, russia), conquests (Japan and Taiwan [China]), the 
demise of colonial rule (eastern India, Kenya, Mozambique, 
Vietnam, Zimbabwe), or the end of major wars (Hungary and 
much of eastern europe).  Attempts at land reform without such 
massive political upheaval have rarely succeeded in transferring 
much of a country’s land or have done so extremely slowly 
because of a lack of political commitment to provide the funding 
to compensate owners.
Land reform might be born from revolts and revolutions but 
the process of reform is often long and complex. Maintaining 
political commitment and consistency in reform processes is a 
key and constraining issue. over time, land reform can become 
a lever for securing political support, whereby land is used to 
reward the party faithful. Issues of equity, efficiency and welfare 
are lost or at least confused.
recognition of the limitations of land markets in an environment 
characterised by multiple weaknesses in other factor markets 
has prompted some policy-makers to impose restrictions on 
their operations. For example, access to working capital (eg to 
acquire inputs) is, in part, dependent on initial wealth. Therefore, 
differential access to finance will often result from inequitable 
land holdings even if land markets are operating efficiently. 
The M4P perspective: aligning poverty reduction objectives with 
strong analysis
Ultimately, M4P is a process that is concerned with ‘outcomes’ 
and takes an evidence-based approach to determining which 
form of solution delivers the best poverty-reducing results in 
any given situation. Inequity, power relations and weaknesses in 
related markets (particularly credit) are all strong rationales for 
intervening actively to reallocate land-holdings. However, whilst 
there have been some successes, there have also been many 
failures and the observed impact on poverty of land reform has 
often been limited. 
An M4P perspective might observe that much of the 
inequality in land ownership distribution actually has its origin 
in interventions motivated by political/social justice concerns 
which view ‘markets’ in a suspicious or hostile light. In spite of, or 
perhaps because of this, policy-makers have often assumed that 
markets will not be able to help correct, and may even reinforce 
or worsen, pre-existing inequalities in land access or ownership. 
However, three main factors are changing these perceptions:
l State allocation of land is often highly politicised with many 
 government-sponsored land redistribution programmes 
 
 failing to meet expectations. This suggests that, at least in some 
 situations, government’s role in land market systems may be as 
 problematic as any other ‘failures’.
l Administrators may be unable to observe producers’ 
 agricultural ability and thus give land to households that are 
 unable to make the best use of it. recent evidence from a 
 number of countries suggests that rental markets transfer land 
 to the poor and more productive.
l There is evidence that, even in situations where land was 
 successfully redistributed, constraints on the functioning of 
 markets may limit beneficiaries’ ability to realise the full gains 
 from such reforms by transferring their use or ownership 
 rights.
Given the importance of land access for the efficiency of 
agricultural production and household investment incentives, how 
land is distributed and the way in which markets for land function 
has important implications for food security and income growth, 
and thus the broader development process at both the household 
and the national level. However, if land generally is important, it is 
less clear which land markets matter most, for example sale and 
ownership, rental or sharecropping.
For land sales markets, the land markets principle of ‘willing 
buyer-willing seller’ is one promoted by DFID and many other 
agencies. This is a perfectly legitimate principle supportive of basic 
personal freedoms and rights. However, if one accepts a starting 
position of inequality in ownership and structural imperfections 
in inter-connected credit markets then it is clear that whilst there 
may be many ‘willing’ buyers amongst the poor, there won’t be as 
many ‘able’ buyers!
of course, in reality households access land through a variety 
of mechanisms – not just land sales. rental markets and 
sharecropping, in particular, often provide an opportunity to adjust 
to credit imperfections in a flexible way with at most moderate 
productivity losses.4 For example, in Colombia findings show 
that sales markets did not increase access to land by producers 
who were more productive and who own less land. However, 
the same research findings showed that land rental markets did 
increase such access.
This picture is highlighted further from recent research in China 
which found not only that, in terms of quantity, rental markets 
have become more important than administrative reallocation, 
but also that markets tended to transfer land to more productive 
and poorer households.5 In other words, land markets were 
better than bureaucrats in transferring land to poor and more 
efficient producers – those with small land endowments and high 
levels of agricultural ability. The implication is that land markets can 
– and do – contribute to higher productivity and greater equity. 
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Sharecropping/share-tenancy is a particular form of land rental 
market. Much tenancy legislation is rooted in a misconception that 
share tenancy is necessarily inefficient and that landlord–tenant 
relations are inevitably exploitative. A substantial literature now 
corrects these misconceptions. a Share-tenancy often represents 
an efficient ‘second-best’ response to missing, thin and imperfect 
markets for land, credit, labour, management, information, and 
insurance. Further, it often performs some important functions 
which would otherwise have to be fulfilled by other institutions 
(social protection for example). It is neither necessarily inefficient 
nor a barrier to the adoption of new technology. Tenancy 
contracts are often part of a series of interlinked, interdependent 
contracts in a number of factor markets (land, labour, credit). 
They are not necessarily exploitative, but where they are, owing 
to the unequal bargaining power between agents, attempts to 
‘fix’ relations in one sphere can lead to compensatory shifts in 
other contracts to leave tenants worse off overall. 6
In light of this, and as a result of weaknesses in credit markets, 
accessing land through rental arrangements will generally offer 
the following benefits: 7
l lower transaction costs;
l greater flexibility;
l reduced reliance on (often distorted) capital markets; 
l reduced exposure to the costs and risks of acquiring land 
 where the price may be determined by factors other than its 
 productive value; whilst 
l allowing lessors and lessees to benefit without the permanent 
 sub-letting (or alienation) of the land.
By putting the poor at the heart of the development process, 
an M4P approach would seek to understand opportunities and 
constraints for the poor to access land. often this means moving 
beyond understanding economic transactions to analysing 
informal and deep-rooted social conditions and institutions. 
From this position of enhanced understanding, an M4P approach 
would seek to intervene sensitively and pointedly to improve 
the flexibility, efficiency and equity of land access. 
security of land tenure and productivity links 
As shown above, access to land is a necessary, but not 
sufficient, step for increasing land productivity. Security of 
tenure is critical in shaping people’s incentives to invest in land. 
People only make efficient private investments if they believe 
that they can reap most, if not all, of the benefits that accrue 
from their investment. 
There is considerable consensus among economists that better 
land rights lead to better outcomes. In fact, a large literature on 
land tenure and investment demonstrates that higher levels of 
tenure security (though not necessarily formal title) will lead 
to greater investment by households.b The empirical evidence 
is not conclusive, though, on which dimensions of land rights 
are crucial. Is ownership of land the most important, or is it the 
ability to transform land into working capital that matters? 
evidence from Vietnam sheds some light on this matter. Land 
reform has been an important thrust of the progressive ‘Doi 
Moi’ policy since 1986. In 1988, the collective land system was 
abandoned in favour of private ownership. while land remains 
the property of the State, rights to use the land were assigned 
to individuals over a period of up to 15 years. In 1993, a 
modified land law was enacted that increased lease term, and 
ensured that land-use rights could now be inherited, transferred, 
exchanged, leased and mortgaged.
It might be expected that the additional land rights conferred 
by the 1993 law would induce households to undertake more 
long-term investments on their land. one way of measuring this 
is by looking at the allocation of land between annual crops 
and multi-year industrial or fruit crops, which typically require 
large investments upfront and yield returns only after a few 
years. results confirmed this hypothesis, showing a statistically 
significant increase in the proportion of total cultivated area 
devoted to multi-year crops. Further results showed that 
households in highly registered provinces increased their 
proportion of irrigated area by about 20% as compared to those 
in low-registered areas. what the results could not show – yet 
– is the returns on these investments and their poverty-related 
impact. 8
Much of the literature has focused on showing the links between 
investment and security of tenure. However, insecure tenure, ie 
the risk of losing land if specific actions are undertaken (such 
as rental or migration), is also likely to impact on households’ 
decision-making on investments. Uncertainty about whether 
or not plots will be possessed in the future is likely to reduce 
investment incentives and behaviour. 
For example, migrant labour is a compensating mechanism 
used by disadvantaged households and is a vital dimension of 
addressing rural poverty (see Paper 3 on M4P and labour). The 
situation in India, where the daily wage of a migrant worker is 
47%-76% higher than wages in their village of origin, is typical. It 
is important for income generally, and in diversifying the source 
of income (ie mitigating income risks of agriculture). However, 
the threat of land loss undermines the ability of the poor to 
pursue this important livelihood diversification strategy.
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The M4P perspective: grounding actions in local realities
As confirmed above, informed by institutional dynamics, 
M4P promotes a real and practical understanding of the way 
poor people do, or should, better interact with markets. This 
perspective is particularly important in the context of security 
of land tenure.
In 1975 the world Bank issued a definitive policy paper on land 
reform. 9 Its major recommendations were: (a) formal land titling 
as a precondition of “modern development”; (b) abandonment 
of communal tenure systems in favour of freehold title and 
sub-division of the commons; (c) widespread promotion of land 
sales markets to bring about efficiency-enhancing land transfers; 
and (d) support for land redistribution on both efficiency and 
equity grounds.
with history and hindsight, the Bank has realised that the 
almost exclusive focus on formal title in the 1975 paper was 
inappropriate, and that much greater attention to the legality 
and legitimacy of existing institutional arrangements is required. 
This recognition of the role and power of institutions, particularly 
informal and cultural norms, in shaping incentives is central to 
the emergence of M4P as a concept. 
In customary systems – strongly characterised in Africa – legal 
recognition of existing rights and institutions is generally more 
effective than premature attempts at establishing formalised 
structures. Legally recognising customary land rights subject 
to a determination of membership and the codification or 
establishment of internal rules and mechanisms for conflict 
resolution can greatly enhance occupants’ security. 
Adams10 (1997) identifies three broad categories of African 
customary land tenure arrangements:
l land-holdings, where individuals or households have relatively 
 exclusive rights of use, based on customary rights;
l common land, where the use rights are shared between 
 multiple users. Such land is generally either managed as a 
 common property resource or is open-access; and
l reserves, where use may be prohibited by the group (eg dry 
 season grazing reserves).
 
Customary land tenure arrangements are often characterised 
as leading to a relatively equitable distribution of land but also 
as relatively inefficient. Such inefficiency might be caused by 
small and fragmented plots, land allocations taking place for 
reasons other than capability, and rigidities in transacting land 
rights. However, they might equally be rooted in weaknesses in 
supporting functions impinging on land such as weak market 
information, low levels of technology and unreliable inputs. 
In short, it should not be assumed that the inadequacies of 
tenure laws and/or administrative support constrain livelihoods 
in practice.  rather, an M4P perspective would be that land tenure 
reform should be responsive to a thorough understanding of the 
livelihood strategies of those it is intended to benefit.
As confirmed above, land rental and sharecropping markets 
are also important mechanisms through which the poor gain 
access to land. In principle, a well-functioning land rental market 
can exist whether land use rights are based on a customary or 
freehold system (although the extent of formality may differ). 
However unfair and inefficient the distribution of land ownership 
or use rights, an active land rental market or strong tradition 
of sharecropping may go a significant way towards improving 
both the efficiency of land use and the quality of opportunities 
available to the poor. 
rental markets have often had a low profile in the consideration 
of land markets and land access, and there are few examples of 
reforms to liberalise land rental markets. However, recent evidence 
points towards a positive effect, suggesting that the concerns of 
critics may be less relevant empirically than often thought. In 
Mexico, abandonment of rental restrictions in the constitutional 
reform of 1992 had a positive impact on productivity, land 
market activity, and equity rather than the predicted wave of land 
sales and destitution.11  A key reason behind this improvement 
in household welfare was that the reforms enabled people to 
participate in off-farm labour markets safe in the knowledge that 
their land was protected.
Transaction costs in land markets can be prohibitively high, 
particularly for the rural poor. c  In India, transaction costs in 
land sale-purchase have been estimated to be up to a third of 
the total value of the land being transacted.12 Such high costs 
go a long way to explaining why so many land-holders do not 
hold effective title to their land. In addition to the high costs of 
levies, other factors can raise transaction costs. In Vietnam, one 
study showed that many land users failed to register transactions 
because they were unaware of the dangers of informality: “one 
household purchased a plot even though the seller refused to transfer 
the formal title. Other households bought land already mortgaged to 
a bank and, therefore, were unable to register the transfers.” 13
M4P promotes poverty solutions which are evidence-based and 
grounded in local realities. recognising alternative ‘non-formal’ 
forms of land access and tenure is a start. working pragmatically 
with local rights holders, authorities and other stakeholders to 
strengthen and codify existing systems is a next step. reducing 
transaction costs, through improving knowledge, information and 
enforcement will also be a critical element of successful reform 
to improve the practical functioning of the land market system. 
c  Transaction costs might typically include formal items such as registration fees, stamp duties and surcharges, and informal items such as bribes to expedite transactions, fees to informal land valuers, etc.
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land and interconnected markets
As mentioned above, for land reform to have a significant impact 
on poverty reduction it must be part of a broader process of 
political, social and economic change, rather than a narrow 
intervention simply to redistribute land. Land is connected with 
many other markets and the functioning of one market can 
strongly influence the functioning of another. Credit markets 
are particularly important. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the 
success of many land reform projects is often linked to access 
to credit.
 
To quote the Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto (2000), 
“In the midst of their own poorest neighbourhoods and shanty 
towns, there are trillions of dollars, all ready to be put to use … 
[Yet] because the rights to these possessions are not adequately 
documented, these assets cannot readily be turned into capital, 
cannot be traded outside of narrow local circles where people know 
and trust each other, cannot be used as collateral for a loan, and 
cannot be used as a share against an investment.”
De Soto outlines numerous reasons why, in some countries, 
the poor have been unable to secure formal title for their land 
assets, including exclusion from the legal process by elites, the 
complexity of formalisation procedures and the high costs of 
undertaking these processes. He estimates the volume of  ‘dead 
capital’ held by the poor at $9.3 trillion globally and identifies 
six ways in which formal land title and land administration 
systems can transform the value of their land assets (Box 2). 
Consistent with the notions expressed above, government land 
titling programmes are often considered a critical instrument 
for increasing access to credit among the poor, and wide 
scale land-titling has become a popular policy prescription for 
alleviating credit rationing in developing countries.14 Feder and 
Feeney15 claim that “the most commonly recognized benefit from 
legal titling of land is the use of those secure ownership rights as 
collateral to solicit credit”.
Box 2
De soto’s six “property effects” of formal land title and land 
administration systems 16
(a) Formal land titles have an abstract economic value, valid in 
  a wide range of contexts, which untitled physical assets alone 
  cannot have (“Fixing the economic potential of assets”).
(b) with a national system of formal land title, economic value 
  implicit within land title has generic worth recognised 
  consistently throughout society (“Integrating dispersed 
  information into one system”).
(c) Formal title gives land-holders legal protection to their land 
  rights from the state but, due to legal mechanisms for 
  forfeiture of title, also creates pressure to honour 
  commitments (“Making people accountable”).
(d) As formal title signifies the abstract economic value of land, 
  more flexible use of assets is possible – eg issuing shares 
  in property, using property to gain access to capital (“Making 
  assets fungible”).
(e) Formal property systems join land users into networks 
  through which their assets can be assembled into more 
  valuable combinations (“Networking people”).
(f) In addition to protecting ownership, formal land title systems 
  that record and register transactions give greater confidence 
  to parties seeking to participate in the market (“Protecting 
  transactions”).
So, in an era of land titling reform motivated by credit market 
improvements, a key question is whether distributing property 
titles to squatter households does in fact encourage lenders to 
use low-income housing as collateral?
The evidence on this point is neither clear nor definitive but 
research in Peru17, De Soto’s home country, is insightful. This 
considered the evidence from a nationwide programme of 
land titling and reviewed whether access to land title increased 
access to credit for the urban poor. Among the key findings 
were the following:
l Despite the distribution of over 1.2 million property titles, credit 
 rationing is still a key feature of the micro-lending environment.
l Post reform, 34% of titled households remain fully rationed 
 out of the formal credit market.
l A limited reduction in overall credit rationing and financial 
 market inequalities for the urban poor associated with titling 
 programmes.
l The bulk of the reduction in credit rationing that was achieved 
 was associated with one particular lending organisation, the 
 publicly funded Materials Bank that supplies in-kind loans of 
 housing construction materials.
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l No effect of formal property ownership on approval rates of 
 private sector lenders. However, conditional on receiving a 
 loan, titled households enjoy private sector interest rates an 
 average of 9% lower than households without title.
These mixed results show that titling efforts will not automatically 
make collateral-based lending viable for the majority of 
formal-sector credit providers. They support a view that land 
titling efforts need to be coordinated and linked with reform in 
financial markets. 
The M4P perspective – interconnected markets and coordinated 
reform
Central to the concept of M4P is the notion that markets 
are interconnected and interdependent. The M4P framework 
supports a co-joined analysis of interconnected markets. what 
are classed as supporting functions (say, credit) in one market 
(say, land) are of course often markets in their own right. By 
applying a common framework to analysing and pursuing 
change in different but connected markets, M4P can bring clarity 
and coordination to reform efforts. 
one example of this is the experience of DFID in South Africa.18 
In 2002 DFID funded the FinMark Trust, as a programme to 
“make financial markets work for the poor”. FinMark researched 
the dynamics of credit and urban housing markets, among 
other sectors. Central to this analysis was the recognition that 
land market issues were undermining efforts of improvement. 
Hence, LandMark, a sister programme tasked to “make land 
markets work for the poor” was established as a specialist unit 
to deepen research, insight and action in land market issues – 
working in coordination with its sister organisation FinMark, 
which continued to engage and address constraints from the 
financial markets perspective.
This concept of interconnected markets extends, of course, 
to many other markets. Flexibility in land markets should allow 
families with excess labour to connect with those lacking in 
labour but relatively abundant in land. The level of development 
of agricultural product markets will strongly influence the 
incentive to invest in land. More fundamental perhaps is the link 
between land and ‘public’ investments – in education, in physical 
infrastructure, in telecommunications .d Some might argue 
that investment in urban infrastructure, upgrading, and social 
programmes may have more effect on informal settlements 
than titling.
The key point for agencies is that action on land will only be 
effective when it forms one element of a broader process of 
reform. “If poor people are to exercise newly acquired land rights, 
they need a range of support services. Only when they have access 
to information, affordable legal advice, methods of dispute resolution 
 
and access to markets, credit and agricultural opportunities, will 
they feel empowered to claim their rights and to turn these into 
improved livelihoods.” 19 This paper argues that M4P can provide 
an organising framework, to promote coherence and consistency 
to such multifaceted and multidimensional reform challenges.
conclusions
Land is highly  emotive and highly political. Successful land reform 
requires long-term political and social commitment. However, as 
demonstrated in this paper, land markets are highly relevant in 
the reform equation. reform that does not put the poor, and 
poverty reduction impacts, at the centre of its agenda threatens 
to miss an opportunity to enhance welfare and equity, and at its 
worst can further entrench people in their poverty reality. 
Successful reform recognises and responds to realities on the 
ground. Formalisation processes of land tenure are important, 
but they should build on existing structures and systems, rather 
than importing external models whose application is too costly 
and complex for most poor people where customary processes 
may matter most in practice. By recognising economic, political 
and social institutions, and offering an organising framework for 
understanding and managing change, M4P is highly relevant to 
such land reform challenges.
Land reform conducted in isolation from wider reform 
processes will not maximise its poverty reduction potential. 
Building on the concept of interconnected markets, M4P can 
certainly offer much to help agencies and governments ensure 
coordination and consistency when pursuing complex and 
multifaceted reform initiatives. For governments in particular, 
M4P offers clarity on the different and more effective roles they 
can play in developing land market systems rather than direct 
land transfer.
s  Transaction costs might typically include formal items such as registration fees, stamp duties and surcharges, 
 and informal items such as bribes to expedite transactions, fees to informal land valuers, etc.
d  ‘Public’ investment does not necessarily mean the state in a role. State roles in relation to, for example, regulation, skills, information and standards might be equally valid.
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introduction
this paper focuses on the application of M4P to agriculture. 
It first establishes the importance of agriculture to poverty 
reduction; in particular, the relevance of agriculture to poor 
people in their capacity as producers, labourers and food 
consumers. in this context and given a number of other 
key trends, it then identifies five issues which need to be 
confronted in developing agriculture market systems and 
views these through the ‘lens’ of M4P. Finally, it concludes 
with comments on the applicability and limitations of M4P in 
agriculture markets.
importance and relevance to the poor
Agriculture markets’ relevance to poor people stems from 
several factors.a 1
l A key source of income: although countries are becoming 
 more urbanised, the majority of people still live in rural areas 
 and poverty remains a predominantly rural phenomenon. 
 Three-quarters of the poor are to be found in rural areas 
 and for them, either as smallholder producers or through the 
 labour market in working for others, agriculture is by far the 
 most important livelihood activity. To a large degree, agriculture 
 is ‘where the poor are’.
l The basis for economic development: agriculture is the largest 
 sector in most low-income countries, for example averaging 
 34% of GDP (up to 80% in the poorest countries) and 64% 
 of employment in Africa. This level of dependence reduces as 
 economies develop (comparable figures in Asia are 20% and 
 43% respectively) and agribusiness (processing and distribution) 
 assumes more importance. Nonetheless, the ‘classic’ economic 
 model of surpluses generated by agriculture forming 
 the foundation for wider development still holds true for most 
 economies.
l The basis of pro-poor growth: growth from agriculture is 
 typically 2-3 times more effective in reducing poverty than 
 non-agriculture-based growth. even as agriculture develops 
 from staple to higher value-added crops, it is relatively labour- 
 intensive and pro-poor in its impact. Growing wealth disparities 
 between urban and rural areas – and the associated social 
 tensions – provide a further rationale for an agriculture focus.
l A major part of the poor’s expenditure: food constitutes a major 
 proportion of the average household budget of the  poor. Many 
 poor households can spend three-quarters of their total budget 
 on food. Higher food prices can result in reduced nutritional 
 intake, with subsequent deleterious effects on welfare.
How agriculture market change affects the poor specifically 
depends on their particular situation. In practice, especially in 
rural areas, there is considerable heterogeneity in the livelihood 
strategies of the poor. Many households have more than one 
source of income with some more reliant on selling labour and 
others on their own production. overall, more of the poor are 
net buyers of food than net sellers but this varies with context: 
only 8% of the Bangladeshi poor are net sellers but in Morocco 
the figure is 35%. Net sellers benefit when productivity gains 
outweigh price reductions; net buyers benefit from lower food 
prices provided that these exceed wage reductions. Productivity 
gains and lower food prices can therefore be regarded as positive 
from a poverty-reducing perspective but the precise impact of 
agriculture market change on the poor depends on the extent 
to which they are producers, labourers or consumers. 
a Unless otherwise stated, background data is from the world Development report 2008, Agriculture for Development.
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some key trends
The obvious importance of agriculture for the poor sets part 
of the context for examining the key issues facing agriculture’s 
development. A number of other general factors and trends 
also need to be recognised.
l The differing productivity record: productivity has grown 
 considerably in some regions and stagnated in others. Asia’s 
 productivity has grown almost three-fold in 40 years but in 
 Africa growth has been a modest 30%. 
l The growing share of world output from developing 
 countries: this has risen to 54% as countries increasingly use 
 their competitive advantage to move into value-added 
 products serving their own populations and export markets.
l Lower public investment: spending on agriculture as a 
 proportion of public spending has declined to 4% (2004) from 
 6.9% (1980) in low-income countries. external assistance for 
 agriculture has also fallen – to 3.5% (2004) of all aid from 18% 
 (1979). 
l The agriculture-environment axis: concerns over climate 
 change and environmental degradation are focusing more 
 attention on agricultural practices and sustainability.
l The growth of supermarkets: although their share of food 
 retailing currently varies (eg 75% in Brazil and less than 3% in 
 India) as personal incomes rise, supermarket growth is a global 
 trend with major implications for suppliers.
l The multiple and interconnected nature of agriculture markets: 
 as the global agriculture industry has become more complex, 
 it is clear that we now need to refer to multiple, interconnected 
 markets rather than a single unitary agriculture market system. 
 Markets for outputs range from specific products to 
 commodities. More complex are the spectrum of input and 
 service markets impinging on farmers and other players in 
 agriculture value chains, including, for example, seeds, fertiliser, 
 water, land, finance and transport as well as (formal and 
 informal) knowledge and information services.
key challenges in developing agriculture markets: the M4P 
perspective
The central relevance of agriculture to the task of poverty 
reduction has raised a number of critical issues and dilemmas 
for development agencies and governments. For each of these, 
M4P, as an approach that is about understanding and then acting 
to change markets, offers either improved clarity in analysis 
or guidance for intervention; ie it is both about what agencies 
do and how they do it. M4P’s value-added stems from, among 
other features:
l developing a transparent view of a market system and of the 
 functions (core transactions, rules and supporting functions) 
 and players within it (Figure 1 offers a simplified view of the 
 agriculture system, using the M4P market system construct); 
l building interventions on the basis of a detailed understanding 
 of markets – including interconnected markets – and of the 
 poor within those markets; 
l identifying underlying systemic constraints; and 
l placing sustainability at the heart of the intervention process.
 
The focus here is on issues in the agriculture sector that have 
a specific M4P perspective and are not the subject of other 
perspective papers. For example, the wider and important 
questions of market access and trade restrictions (in particular by 
high-income economies) are not addressed. However, it should be 
said that demonstrable actions to improve market development in 
the ways described below are likely to bring about an environment 
that supports more liberalised (and fairer) trade and more effective 
international actions. And finance, labour and land markets are all 
critical for successful agricultural development but are dealt with 
elsewhere (Papers 2, 3 and 4). The issues highlighted here deal with 
inputs, prices, information, coordination and the environment.
How can input markets be made to work better?
Appropriate use of inputs is key to higher productivity in agriculture. 
In particular, better use of high-quality seeds and fertiliser results in 
significantly higher yields. For example, the ‘yield gap’ in maize – ie 
the difference between average performance and that achieved 
in demonstrations – is typically 3-5 times. Much of the green 
revolution’s success in Asia was based on improved supply of inputs 
and the absence of any comparable ‘revolution’ in Africa – where 
conditions are more varied and difficult – has long been a source 
of frustration. How to stimulate greater supply and use of inputs 
remains a core development challenge.
one common response to this challenge is to subsidise the 
consumption of inputs. The rationale here is that input markets 
don’t work effectively because of the: 
l production and price uncertainties associated with rain-fed 
 agriculture; 
l risks inherent in new technologies; and 
l difficulties in supplying to geographically diverse smallholder 
 farmers.
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The resulting relatively high costs and risks provide both 
efficiency and welfare reasons for government support. In the 
past, governments have controlled the distribution of inputs 
directly but the high costs of parastatal operations and their 
openness to manipulation by special interests has reduced 
(or eliminated) their role.2 Yet subsidies for the supply and 
consumption of inputs are still common and are increasing in 
some instances. 37% of the Zambian agriculture budget goes 
directly to subsidies. In India the figure is 75% – up from 40% 
in 1979. And the Malawian government (with donor support) 
is implementing an extensive programme of maize seed and 
fertiliser subsidy through retailers – reducing the price to 
one-third of the previous value. Initial evaluations suggest that 
the subsidy has led to an additional 300-400,000 tonnes of maize 
production, worth far more than the $70m subsidy cost.3
The M4P perspective: focusing on constraints and sustainability
The key question to consider in assessing the efficacy of 
subsidies is, how do they contribute to the development of 
more effective, inclusive and sustainable markets (the M4P acid 
test)? This general position is especially relevant in relation to 
input subsidies where – in an almost formulaic manner – it is 
possible to generate spectacular short-term output gains by 
directing more inputs into cultivation and believe (wrongly) that 
this is equivalent to longer-term development. 
In this light, it is clear that sustainable markets are often not the 
real goal of subsidies. Fertiliser subsidies, for example in India, are 
a favoured politicians’ instrument to woo farmers’ votes and their 
longer-term impact is a secondary concern. More legitimately 
 
perhaps, fertiliser subsidies are seen to be an effective means 
of offering welfare (reducing the cost of production and the 
price of food) to the poor. However in providing the subsidy in 
this way rather than allocating food stamps/vouchers to poor 
consumers, for example, subsidy is directed into the heart of 
the input supply market, and so impacts on the price signals 
and incentives shaping supplier and farmer behaviour. The 
thrust of the welfare ethos is therefore felt directly by players 
in the input market rather than by food consumers.
An M4P perspective on agriculture input supplies has a 
number of features. First, the starting point is a more detailed 
assessment of the systemic constraints impinging on the 
market, on both demand- and supply-sides. Subsidies are a 
blanket intervention that encourages supply and consumption 
but does not focus on specific factors that prevent the market 
from working – for example, poor supply-side practices or 
a lack of risk-taking innovation or of information – or that 
disguise flaws in interconnected markets such as finance or 
land.
Second, interventions to promote the market are based on a 
vision of how it should work sustainably in the longer term. If 
direct subsidies are genuinely seen to be a continuing feature 
of the market this has to be justified (on a welfare basis) and 
provision set aside for continued public finance. If subsidies are 
seen to be a short-term stimulus to a longer-term ‘subsidy-free’ 
vision, the pathway through which this may happen needs to be 
laid out rather than presented as a distant (often disingenuous) 
aspiration.
figure 1
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b The exit of the state from a dominant purchasing role in many countries was not successful because the ‘privatisation’ process created a vacuum which was not filled by appropriate public rules and standards 
 to shape behaviour.
Third, direct transaction-focused subsidies are used with caution 
and for a clear purpose. Placing financial subsidies at the heart of 
the transaction in a market system is inherently more invasive, 
especially if they are of a significant size and duration. An M4P 
perspective is certainly not opposed to consumption subsidies 
per se but it is cognisant of their potential to encourage market 
players into a ‘comfortable’ pattern of behaviour that expects 
subsidy to continue rather than to stimulate innovation; ie it can 
be dependency-creating rather than catalytic. 
How can price instability be reduced in agriculture markets?
A characteristic problem affecting many agriculture markets 
is price volatility. In conditions of substantial information and 
power asymmetry, producers sell to traders in spot markets. 
Prices commonly fluctuate from one harvest/year to another 
causing a boom-bust/shortage-glut pattern of production. For 
example, record grain harvests for ethiopian farmers in 2001 
were followed by an 80% price collapse in 2002.
Farmers taking decisions in these situations on what and how 
much to produce and what prices to seek are likely to be risk-
averse and make poor decisions. The prevailing uncertainty 
and variability in returns is a disincentive to investment and 
innovation and a major barrier to agricultural development. In 
response to this problem, governments traditionally played a 
direct role in the procurement of food staples. Their role is now 
more restricted to establishing emergency reserves, following 
widespread acceptance of the inefficiencies of government as a 
buyer. Governments have also sought to be direct providers of 
price information but the results here have also typically been 
disappointing. In recognition of these limitations, there are now 
more varied efforts to develop improved market information 
systems.
The M4P perspective: strengthening private sector-led services
The above experiences have taught that the apparent certainties 
of the past – for example that price information is a ‘public 
good’ to be delivered by the state – were chimeras that have 
no legitimate place in the future. The challenges ahead are 
concerned with the development of market information and 
pricing systems that recognise the different roles to be played 
by different players. For example:
l Longer-term contracts between farmers and buyers – either 
 retailers (supermarkets) or contract farmers.
l Private commercial media – such as radio – presenting public 
 price information.
l Internet-and phone-based services such as rural kiosks or SMS 
 messaging services.
l Market mechanisms such as commodity exchanges offering 
 futures and options contracts and a means to smooth 
 production and price variations.
The private sector is often best placed to play the lead role 
in developing these services, with the capacity and incentives 
to develop them successfully. However, often the introduction 
of the services represents substantial change and may require 
external assistance.
However, at the centre of many of these innovations are roles 
which can only be played by public organisations, either business 
membership organisations (BMos) or, more likely, government. 
New mechanisms for buying and selling, for example, can only 
be developed when set in a context of appropriate rules 
and standards.b And, while mechanisms for delivering price 
information should be increasingly through the private sector, 
the collection of ‘official’ prices is a public function. M4P helps 
to provide a framework within which to develop these new 
public–private collaborations to mitigate the problems of price 
instability. 
How can the flow of technologies, ideas and knowledge to 
agriculture be improved?
The pace of change in global agriculture is increasing. The rate of 
technology and process development and adaptation increased 
significantly in the 1980s and 90s – even compared with the 
green revolution decades (the 1960s and 70s) Clearly, processes 
of innovation and change will continue to be important in the 
future as an inherent part of the market system. The challenge 
is to ensure that this extends to include those producers who 
have not discernibly improved performance.
Technology development involves both (a) genetic development 
of new breeds and, as important, their ‘maintenance’ against 
disease resistance, and (b) process and management 
improvement relating to agriculture practices – such as the 
development of zero tillage (used in almost half the arable land in 
Latin America).  In most low-income economies, developments 
originate in public r&D centres funded by governments (and/
or donors). Unlike high-income economies, where potential 
markets are larger and there is intellectual property rights 
(IPr) protection, private r&D is rare. Traditionally also the 
dissemination of new knowledge to users has been promoted 
through public extension services.
recent trends indicate that public r&D has languished in many 
countries and often accounts for less public expenditure than 
either extension services or input subsidies. Yet, while the returns 
on r&D investments are high, the efficacy of extension services 
is widely questioned. Indeed, the training and visit (T&V) public 
extension system supported in up to 70 countries in the 1980s 
and 90s is acknowledged to have largely failed. 4
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The M4P perspective: recognising complementary public and 
private roles
Developing a more effective environment for knowledge 
generation and application requires more efficient allocation 
of roles and collaboration between different players. A key 
priority for government should be basic r&D – a public role that 
really only it can play – as a supporting function to processes 
of knowledge transfer. An M4P perspective would urge the 
prioritisation of these roles and placing resources here rather 
than in more politically expedient private input subsidies or in 
public extension.
The core role of delivering knowledge services is more 
problematic: who has the incentives and capacity to play this role 
effectively? Publicly funded and delivered extension services do 
not appear to be the answer but there is no immediate, simple 
alternative. In practice, successful mechanisms for knowledge 
delivery are likely to involve a variety of arrangements of public 
and private players with varying combinations of financing (who 
pays) and provision (who does) and information available from 
a variety of sources. This might include:
l Input suppliers’ networks with retailers becoming information 
 hubs as well as input providers – as in Bangladesh and 
 Cambodia. 5
l An expanded role for BMos, with public funding, in developing 
 improved information networks – eg the wool-growers 
 association in South Africa. 6
l Improved information through large–small sub-contracting 
 supply relationships.
l More informed and accessible ‘how to’ information through 
 commercial media. 7
l For more established agri-business, the emergence of 
 specialised consultants.
Although there is an array of promising initiatives it is clear that 
there are no standard, one-size-fits-all models that are universally 
applicable. In each case, successful knowledge delivery is likely 
to be led by private players; government’s role increasingly 
should be to develop knowledge and actively manage working 
relationships with private providers.
How can coordination be improved throughout the 
agriculture market system?
An inherent tension is increasingly apparent in agriculture sectors. 
on the one hand, more output is in specialised value-chains, 
in national and international markets with exacting quality 
and performance standards. on the other hand, agriculture 
is still often characterised by large numbers of independent 
(low-income) smallholders. A critical issue is how this group can 
participate in value-chain based growth. 8
For this to happen, effective coordination mechanisms need 
to be developed to manage the interface between these two 
worlds – small-scale/traditional and large-scale/sophisticated – 
and to reduce the transaction costs of dealing with small-scale 
players and increase their bargaining power. Coordination may 
be necessary, for example in relation to buying inputs, selling 
products, accessing knowledge and information, complying with 
standards and negotiating over market rules.
Currently, the effectiveness of coordination – and the means 
through which it is pursued – varies considerably. The collapse 
of state-controlled systems has left a vacuum in many countries. 
BMos are widespread in most countries, drawn together 
precisely to address coordination issues. However, their wider 
record is mixed with different levels of capacity and performance. 
In addition, there are increasing examples of large firms linking 
with smallholders through different mechanisms.
The M4P perspective: improving coordination through BMOs and 
business linkages
M4P recognises coordination explicitly as a key supporting 
function but does not offer any blueprint as to how this 
should be achieved. Clearly, there are still strong arguments 
for supporting the development of BMos for farmers – locally 
and nationally. However, in doing so, agencies have to be aware 
of the uneven record of ‘support’ for BMo development. 
where BMos succeed, it is usually on the basis of strong and 
competent leadership; where these qualities are absent, BMos 
can be captured by vested interests and sink into dependency 
and dysfunction. The ‘rules’ for engaging with BMos (see Good 
Practice Note 5.6 in the Operational Guide) apply in agriculture 
as they do elsewhere.
Coordination through more innovative business models in value 
chains is a more recent and perhaps promising development. This 
might include, for example, new business models for contract 
farming and for product buying which include information and 
advice. But corporate players are under increasing pressure 
to develop more inclusive business models that still deliver 
value-added for them and their stakeholders. How to achieve 
these relationships without demoting them to ‘corporate charity’ 
remains a challenge. Moreover, the extent to which building 
smallholder groups is a wider public or narrower private role is 
a grey area. engaging with lead firms to encourage this type of 
innovation is a key focus for M4P (see Good Practice Note 5.7 
in the Operational Guide).
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How can agriculture be developed in an environmentally 
sustainable manner?
Agriculture’s output and productivity achievements have often 
been at the expense of the environment. Intensive production 
can reduce soil fertility, deplete water resources and increase the 
soil concentration of nitrates and pesticides. In extreme cases, 
the very productivity gains achieved through intensification are 
now under threat from the environmental degradation caused 
by it.  where agriculture has been expanded into new geographic 
areas, this has often been at the expense of habitat.
For individual farmers, one key problem is the lack of incentive 
to change. They may be motivated to address problems directly 
affecting their own performance but wider externalities related 
to, for example, pollution, resource depletion, biodiversity, 
carbon emissions and disease are not their immediate concern. 
exacerbating this basic problem is the characteristic weakness in 
the institutional environment in developing and enforcing rules 
or supporting collective action to address externalities and 
force a change in behaviour. 
The M4P perspective: building incentives and institutions to 
support change
The critical question posed in M4P is what is required to induce 
change in market players’ behaviour. This means considering 
the incentives and capacity for change and in turn the rules 
and supporting functions impacting on market transactions. In 
a complex situation, a number of areas of change are suggested 
through M4P.
l Using the price mechanism to incentivise change: farmers are 
 unlikely to change practices until the beneficiaries of change 
 – consumers and wider society – pay/compensate them for 
 doing so. New mechanisms such as Payment for environmental 
 Services (PeS)9 – which has been used primarily by water 
 users to pay for forest conservation – and carbon payments 
 (see Paper 8) potentially offer an efficient process of influencing 
 farmer decision-making. 
l refocusing r&D to better environmental practices: the 
 development of new technologies and management systems 
 that can offer farmers the capacity to change.
l Institutional development: supporting individual incentive and 
 capacity change, developing institutions to enforce rules locally 
 and organisations to take the collective steps required to, for 
 example, manage resources more efficiently. 
conclusions
The above arguments illustrate the relevance of M4P to 
agriculture. M4P provides value first by offering clarity in 
analysis – a transparent means through which governments and 
development agencies can examine the overall market system 
and their own role in developing it.  And second, given this clarity, 
by providing guidance for interventions.
The agriculture market system is obviously large, multifaceted 
and complex. There are no simple, panacea-like approaches 
to its development. M4P does not provide any unique insights 
into the many detailed technical debates in agriculture but it 
does present a strategic framework to address the overarching 
strategic and operational issues of incentives, roles, structures 
and mechanisms. Moreover, since M4P approaches are currently 
being used in different aspects of agriculture market development, 
its relevance and applicability have a strong practical basis.
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introduction
this paper focuses on the application of M4P to increasing 
access to improved water services. a It first elaborates on the 
scale of the problem and the wide-ranging poverty implications 
resulting from a lack of access to improved water services.
key issues – of increasing physical access, of affordability 
and of service quality – are discussed in the context of the 
main challenges in meeting the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDG) targets on water access.  The value of M4P in 
organising a response to each of these challenges is presented. 
The paper concludes with comments on the applicability and 
limitations of M4P in increasing access to improved water 
services.
Background – scale of the problem, and links to poverty
In the 1990s the number of children killed by diarrhoea – the 
result of unsafe water and sanitation – exceeded the number of 
people killed in armed conflicts since the Second world war. 1 
Inevitably it is the poorest and most marginalised sections of 
society that suffer the most. Poor women and children spend 
much of their time collecting water rather than working or 
going to school. In Pakistan half of girls drop out of class just 
because schools do not have latrines.
Theoretically, every living being has access to water (if they did 
not, they would be dead!). what matters are the conditions 
of this access – how much, at what price (monetary and 
opportunity cost), at what level of quality, and so on. Lack of 
access to improved water services impacts on many dimensions 
of poverty, as expressed by the MDGs. Lack of access to water 
and sanitation can impact negatively on education targets, as 
above. Since clean water and sewage treatment are critical to 
controlling the spread of infectious and parasitic diseases, lack 
of access to improved water services directly undermines 
ambitions for improved health targets.
Improving the health and education levels of the workforce is a 
critical factor for increasing productivity, which in turn builds the 
national competitiveness that is so crucial in delivering sustained 
long-term economic growth. The contention that growth is 
highly contingent on the state of human capital in a country is 
clearly demonstrated in empirical growth literature.2  3
The link between income poverty and non-income poverty 
is clearly a two-way relationship – a virtuous circle.4 Pro-poor 
growth delivers greater resources for investment in non-income 
aspects of poverty, in turn building human capital, supporting 
productivity growth and fostering the higher competitiveness 
essential for sustained long-term economic growth.
econometric reassessments of the three largest reductions 
of rural poverty accomplished over the last 30 years (China, 
India and Indonesia) are unanimous in attributing a large role 
to infrastructure investment. water provision is a central part 
of this equation. Infrastructure sectors support the productivity 
of the poor in a variety of ways. Infrastructure reduces risks 
in productive private investment, it supports more efficient 
trade promotion, and it is critical in mitigating natural disasters. 
However, increasing access to services – particularly energy and 
water – is particularly important in building the human capital of 
the poor, which in turn allows them to participate in, and benefit 
more directly from, growth processes.
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Improved access to water also has immediate poverty-reducing 
benefits. A detailed study in Argentina5 found that child mortality 
fell 5-7% in areas that increased access to water services overall. 
The effect was greatest in the poorest areas; it was estimated 
that child mortality fell by 24% in the poorest municipalities 
because of a reduction in the number of deaths caused by 
infectious and parasitic disease.
Delivering the MDg targets: access, affordability and 
responsiveness
 
MDG 7: “Ensure Environmental Sustainability” sets the 2015 target 
to “reduce by half the proportion of people without sustainable 
access to safe drinking water”. responding to this call to action 
requires progress be made in the three inter-related elements of 
access, affordability and service responsiveness.
access
More than 1bn people still lack access to clean and safe water. 
This figure has held fairly constant for decades, in spite of the 
fact that almost 97% of fixed water distribution infrastructure is 
in the hands of the public sector. Given the scale of the problem, 
and the scale of the resources required to address the problem, 
harnessing the skills, expertise and finance of the private sector is 
often a matter of necessity. equally, it is highly likely that organised 
community structures will feature as part of the solution, just 
as users themselves will, in respect of the fees they pay being 
reinvested in improved and extended provision.
The debate over private participation in water provision is 
typically polarised and heated. opponents often argue that water 
is a basic right, and not a commodity to be traded. They are 
concerned that the poor will lose their rights if they have to pay 
for water.  These debates are not new – just as the role of the 
private sector in water provision is not new. In London private 
companies supplied water for more than 400 years with little 
government restriction on entry.  By the 19th century, 95% of 
London residents received piped supply from private companies 
and a majority had direct home connection.  However, in 1818 
the (private) Grand Junction water Company (London) rejected 
accusations of profiteering and issued notices rebutting “attempts 
to mislead and prejudice the public”, stating that the company 
directors were in fact operating “at great loss to themselves”.6
An in-depth report on independent water and sanitation 
providers in ten African cities7 confirmed that over 75% of the 
urban poor get water directly from a range of private but small 
independent providers. Sanitation services are in most cases 
provided exclusively by such providers. In rural areas, where 
network infrastructure is often not economically or technically 
viable, the poor are almost exclusively reliant on private providers 
for improved access to water.
If access to improved water services is the key policy issue, then 
debate must focus on how best to achieve this. There is no single 
uniform solution; improving access requires partnerships that 
maximise resources from the public, private and community 
sectors. 
affordability
In terms of affordability, the poor pay more. How much more 
depends on a number of factors. Table 1 shows findings from a 
recent major study in Africa which confirms that those without 
access to networked provision pay more than those who do ... 
and this means the poor.
often smaller water providers operate informally and are 
unrecognised by the state. The risks of this illegitimacy tend to be 
reflected in their investment and pricing patterns, whereby returns 
are sought in the shorter term and the tariffs set are based on 
higher average rather than lower marginal costs of production. 
Licensing and regulating such providers can result in much better 
terms being offered, and often such non-networked provision is 
the only viable option. So, even where the full-scale economies 
of networked services can’t be achieved, opportunities are there 
for ensuring that the poor get a better deal.
Subsidies are a major discussion point within the debate on 
affordability. However, the poor-pay-more pattern is often 
intensified when network prices, through subsidy, are offered at 
below an economic price. Not only do the poor pay more to start 
with, but the fact that subsidy goes to those already networked 
means that the poor face a double disadvantage. For example, 
in Panama poverty is primarily rural, but IDAAN (the national 
water utility) operates almost exclusively in towns. only 16% of 
IDAAN’s customers live below the poverty line. Nevertheless, at 
least two-thirds of IDAAN’s customers are subsidised. 8
table 1












Source: Collignon, B & Vezina, M (2000)
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If the poor are paying six times more now (Table 1), doubling 
the network tariff would still mean that they are paying three 
times as much as others. However, the additional revenues 
raised through increasing the network tariff could be invested in 
expanding access and connectivity. From a poverty reduction and 
welfare distribution perspective, access matters more than price. 
As confirmed in one major study on the distributional impact 
of privatisation in Latin America 9, “even if prices did go up, their 
effects were dominated by the corresponding increases in access 
that occurred in the bottom or lower half of the distribution”. 
service responsiveness
Growth research of the 1990s highlighted the importance of 
the quality of countries’ economic institutions in responding to 
emerging needs and developing new opportunities. For example, 
the low quality of infrastructure services provided in areas that 
have already been connected to the network is a problem 
at least as serious as the limited extent of networks; in 2004 
one-third of rural infrastructure in South Asia was estimated to 
be dysfunctional. 10
The key issue that emerges, for water and for other infrastructure 
sectors, is how to develop organisational hierarchies that 
focus all bodies effectively on efficient, innovative and higher-
productivity service provision (whether this is a networked 
utility or small informal operator). Incentives to more efficient 
customer service and to continuous innovation can be ensured 
much more easily in many aspects of infrastructure provision 
and operation by recourse to competition among independent 
suppliers under light government regulation.
New institutional alternatives to the traditional public sector 
infrastructure monopoly include private provision (across 
the full spectrum of agencies from multinational companies 
to street-level water vendors), commercially operated public 
sector provision, and user partnerships. All of these should 
provide an element of competition. In these circumstances, the 
government’s role is to concentrate on effective delivery of the 
many services that it alone can provide, and to ensure pro-poor 
regulation of private, commercial and community delivery of the 
other services.
In some cases those approaches may involve large foreign 
private investment, but in almost all they are likely to increase, 
to some degree, the role of the private sector, domestic and 
foreign, in direct management of maintenance and operations, 
with effective performance incentives.
Small local providers (private companies or community-based 
organisations), which have generally been disregarded at the 
time of water company concessioning (despite the sizeable role 
they have often been playing), may be particularly important 
because of the time it will take to extend central supply networks. 
Accustomed to working in a competitive environment, the more 
experienced of these providers are often more enterprising than 
the state utilities in designing their works, services and collection 
procedures to fit the particular needs of their clients.
The M4P perspective: how to respond to the challenge  
of increasing access to improved water services
Access, affordability and responsiveness are all critical 
determinants for the delivery of improved water services. For 
each of these determinants, M4P, as an approach that is about 
understanding and then acting to change market systems, offers 
either improved clarity in analysis or guidance for intervention. 
It is both about what agencies do and how they do it. M4P’s 
value-added stems from, among other features:
l developing a transparent view of a market system and of the 
 functions (core transactions, rules and supporting functions) 
 and players within it; 
l building interventions on the basis of a detailed understanding 
 of markets and the poor within them; 
l identifying underlying systemic constraints (and therefore 
 distinguishing between symptoms and causes); and 
l ensuring that sustainability is at the heart of the intervention 
 process.
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A central concept in M4P is the market access frontier 
(Figure 1). A number of challenges and perspectives central to 
M4P emerge from this.
A = Network system
B = expanded network system
C = Non-networked system
Pushing out the access frontier – a systemic response
As shown in Figure 1, often the potential exists to push out the 
access frontier for networked water services to currently unserved 
or underserved consumers. Too often this challenge is relegated 
to a narrow technical solution of liberalisation and regulation – 
setting service standards on coverage for the utility. However, as 
shown clearly in various studies, the challenge of extending access 
can be quite involved and complex. Getting the right skilled and 
incentivised providers, operating under a progressive regulatory 
framework which is governed by a professional and progressive 
regulatory system, is necessary, but not sufficient. extending access 
requires a range of other ‘solutions’:
l Technologies – extending access often requires new and lower- 
 cost technical solutions, for example, condominial technology.
l Billing and collections – extending access means taking 
 water to new communities about which the utility may have 
 no credit information, understanding or relationships. This 
 lack of information can lead to reduced service responsiveness. 
 Finding innovative ways to ‘get into’ communities is important 
 if services are to be well targeted and efficient.
l Community engagement – even with lower-cost technologies, 
 connection charges can still be prohibitively high. Depending 
 on the technology being used, there may be opportunities 
 for lowering the cost of connections to communities willing to 
 invest their labour in return for a discount.
l Financial services and building supplies – in order to access 
 piped water, many dwellings require investment and upgrading. 
 New kitchens, bathrooms and related appliances are necessary. 
 Access to finance is important to pay for these investments. 
 There might be a role for microfinance here, or perhaps 
 engagement with building supplies merchants to offer new 
 ranges and ‘deals’ to lower income consumers who are soon 
 to be connected.
l education – increasing access to water must also be 
 supported by initiatives aimed at changing perceptions and 
 habits of consumers in favour of using more water, and using it 
 appropriately.
The picture is quite complex. M4P offers a framework within 
which a range of market analysis tools that can be deployed 
effectively to gain insight into this more complete picture. A more 
complete picture supports more effective implementation.
the importance of interconnected market systems
Networks benefit from scale economies and can therefore offer 
better value than non-networked forms of water provision. 
However, expanding network access is not always feasible, for 
technical, economic or service reasons. This might be the case 
particularly in rural areas and large-scale informal peri-urban 
slum settlements where much of the world’s poverty is 
entrenched. In these cases access to improved water services 
will be through non-networked sources. 
Studies in Dar es Salaam, Kampala, Mombasa and Nairobi 
(1998-99)11 identified success factors of informal private water 
providers in water supply services. They can:
l respond to the dynamics of market demand, unlike mono- 
 polistic public enterprises;
l access peri-urban or informal settlement areas not covered by 
 the public operator;
l be commercially-oriented;
l respond to market needs in densely populated areas by 
 providing service options; and
l operate other parallel businesses.
These non-networked water markets are often competitive 
and dynamic. But equally often they are informal, unregulated 
and inefficient. As a framework matching multiple players, and 
multiple functions, M4P can also offer a useful tool for managing 
change in such markets.
Creating a more enabling environment which seeks to recognise, 
formalise and regulate players in these markets is critical. The 
benefits of a more fruitful engagement by governments with 
this market segment can realise many service quality and access 
benefits through:
l providers building the confidence to invest and expand their 
 operations;
figure 1 
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l governments concentrating energies and resources towards 
 governance and enabling (rather than direct providing) roles; 
 and 
l network providers focusing on improving their existing 
 services.
Some water utilities have tried regulating the prices charged 
by water vendors, or challenging their rights to operate. This 
affects the viability of these smaller operators. United by a 
commitment to improved access, new partnerships need to 
evolve that put the poor at the heart of the process, and create 
new relationships that strengthen the coordination of players 
within and between different market segments.
For example, Mali’s water Advisory Unit offers member water 
users’ associations a package of financial, management and 
training services in return for a fee paid for each cubic metre 
of water distributed by the association. This arrangement 
has been relatively successful, resulting in a reduction of unit 
operating costs by over half over a five-year period (1994-99) 
from about US$0.70 to US$0.30 per cubic metre. As a result of 
this connection between actors in different parts of the water 
market, poor consumers now pay lower prices, for better quality 
water which is more available than before.
incentives and capacities are critical
The relevant MDG sets a clear target to reduce by half the 
proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking 
water by 2015. Achieving this will require a multi-stakeholder 
response that harnesses the respective capacities, skills and 
resources of the public, private and civil sectors.  New partnerships 
will need to be formed that are structured according to the 
respective merits and abilities of each stakeholder grouping, 
with the focus on delivery of results not ideology.
Progressive market liberalisation should not be confused with 
the non-transparent granting of long-term exclusive concessions 
to a small number of very powerful international water 
utilities overseen by weak national regulatory frameworks and 
regulators. Any liberalisation agenda should be guided by:
l balanced partnerships whereby roles and responsibilities are 
 clearly defined and power relations are balanced between 
 stakeholders;
l leveraging the expertise and skills of national as well as 
 international operators;
l joining up segments of the market system, including networked 
 and non-networked markets;
l the overriding goals of increased access, affordability and 
 responsiveness.
The political economy of water – rights versus realities – is such 
that governments and development partners embarking on reform 
need to consider and to actively engage in building constituencies 
for change. An M4P perspective would seek to identify key ‘drivers 
of change’b and related analysis in seeking to understand such 
constituencies in order to smooth a pathway for reform. 
Putting the poor at the heart of the development process
M4P supports a people-centred approach to development. 
Involving and engaging the poor directly should be an important 
feature of public investment decision-making. All too often, 
though, the poor are not involved. This can mean that decisions 
are taken remotely and based on highly aggregated and generally 
poor-quality information. There are many examples where 
populations within communities have organised themselves 
to participate in the governance of an infrastructure provider 
(most often in the water sector). Similarly there have also 
been instances (albeit fewer in number) where populations 
have contributed capital to finance investments for system 
development. 
For example, in Cambodia electricity customers have often 
contributed in advance to the costs of construction for system 
expansion (lines and transformers). In addition, at least 60% of 
village households agreed to pay house wiring and construction 
costs. In some cases, villages were so keen to have electricity 
that they collected funds among themselves to finance 100% of 
the distribution equipment. 
M4P offers a sounds basis for understanding the position of 
the poor and how they participate in and are affected by 
markets. By engaging the poor in analysis and intervention 
design, M4P solutions are often better targeted, more likely to 
be more responsive to needs and realities, and ultimately more 
sustainable. 
subsidies: an approach to innovation and targeting
In merit goods markets, like water, where various externalities 
are more prevalent, there is a stronger need for public functions 
related to aspects such as regulation, social protection and health. 
In view of this, there may be a case for selective subsidies for 
water consumption. However, the many operational challenges 
of working with subsidies are well known. what is clear from 
research (and of course it depends on access patterns initially) 
is that poverty reduction and welfare goals are better served 
when subsidy is used in support of expanding access rather than 
in depressing prices for those already connected. 
United by a clear access objective, underpinned by a detailed 
understanding of markets and a people-centred perspective, 
M4P supports innovative approaches to intervention – including 
the role of subsidies. equally, with its focus on sustainability, M4P 
is concerned to ensure that governments budget appropriately 
for the inherited liabilities that recurrent subsidies will generate. 
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Innovative solutions do not always need to be planned, of 
course.  Alternatively, by taking a more systemic perspective, 
and by stimulating genuine competition in merit goods markets, 
innovative solutions can emerge through this competition. Chile 
offers a seemingly successful example of a highly innovative 
approach to the promotion of new power connections which, 
within five years, raised rural electric coverage from 57% in 1994 
to 75% in 1999, benefiting 113,000 households.12 Concessions 
were awarded to the company offering the largest discount on 
the maximum allowable subsidy calculated by the government 
on the basis of the difference between estimated social and 
private returns for each project. The service expansion was 
thus co-financed by government ($112 mn, out of its general 




Merit goods markets, such as water, are complex and detailed. 
Discussions and perspectives are as detailed as they are divergent. 
In this context, this paper attempts to capture a number of key 
themes and issues, and to demonstrate the resonance and 
relevance of M4P to each of these. 
M4P does not provide any unique insights into the many detailed 
technical debates within the water sector. It does, however, focus 
debate on the objective of access and the relevance of markets 
to this goal. As a systemic multi-player, multi-function approach 
M4P offers a highly relevant strategic framework for agencies 
concerned with organising and progressing on the global 
challenge of increasing access to improved water services for 
more than one billion currently underserved people.
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introduction
this paper focuses on the application of M4P to understanding 
and intervention in the political economy - the processes, 
incentives and structures around government decision-making 
and reform. It does so through political markets, defined as 
the transactional relationship between, on the one hand, the 
poor being capable and able to demand – and on the other, 
governments being willing and capable to supply.  As shown, 
the quality and efficacy of this transactional relationship 
determines development outcomes. 
The paper first explores the importance and relevance 
of political markets to the poor and the general nature of 
imperfections in political markets that undermine transaction 
quality and contribute to poverty incidence. it then considers 
how an M4P perspective can support improved practice 
through taking a more systemic approach to reform.
importance and relevance for the poor
The effectiveness of the state is increasingly recognised as a key 
determining factor in whether or not successful development 
takes place. effective states are those that are capable of helping 
business grow and ensuring the delivery of relevant services to 
their citizens. effective states are those which are accountable and 
responsive to all of their citizens.
An example from India illustrates the point. 
The Indian states of Kerala and Uttar Pradesh are states within one 
federal nation.1 They are subject to the same constitution, laws and 
intergovernmental finance system, and are subject to the same 
election cycles. However, development outcomes in Kerala and 
Uttar Pradesh are quite different. women born in Kerala can expect 
to live 20 years longer than women in Uttar Pradesh. Uttar Pradesh’s 
infant mortality rate is almost six times higher than Kerala’s. At the 
turn of the century, one in three girls in Uttar Pradesh had never 
been to school, as compared to universal enrolment in Kerala.
In terms of education and health services, public facilities in Kerala 
are likely to be regularly manned by teachers or physicians, well 
supplied and adequately maintained. This is not the case in Uttar 
Pradesh. If a public primary health centre is not attended for a few 
days in Kerala, people are likely to protest at the nearest district 
office. In Uttar Pradesh a rural school can be non-functional for 
years, with teachers absent or shirking but without any civic protest. 
effective states are those where citizens have the knowledge and 
power to make demands (voice), and those in positions of power 
have the capacity and will to respond (accountability).  enhancing 
citizen voice and accountability has increased in importance 
for agencies in recent years. Voice refers to the capacity to 
express views and interests and to the exercise of this capacity. 
Accountability exists when those who set and implement a 
society’s rules – politicians and public officials – are answerable to 
the people who live under those rules.
A framework for voice and accountability is shown in Figure 1. 
The relationship between voice and accountability is clearly shown 
as one which is ‘transactional’ in nature. 
figure 1
a transactional picture of voice and accountability
the poor
voice




willingness and capacity to 
supply
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The ‘quality’ of the transaction can be defined by the ‘balance’ 
between voice – poor people being capable and able to demand 
– and accountability – governments being willing and capable to 
supply. when this balance exists, as in the example of Kerala, 
transactional quality is high, and development outcomes are 
positive. In the case of Uttar Pradesh the picture is unbalanced, 
with resulting lower transaction quality manifested in more 
negative development outcomes.
The picture presented here is one of a political market. The core 
of this market is defined by citizens and governments, engaging 
in a transactional relationship where the actions of one party 
influence the actions of the other (and vice versa). when power 
relations are balanced, the market is perfect and transactional 
quality is high. when the market suffers from imperfections, 
transactional quality is affected and outcomes may well suffer.
Keefer and Khemani 2 argue that the observed differences 
in Kerala and Uttar Pradesh can be explained in terms of 
imperfections in political markets. Specifically, three political 
market imperfections were identified as important in the 
context of government incentives to serve the poor: lack of 
information among voters about politician performance; social 
fragmentation among voters manifested as identity-based voting; 
and lack of credibility of political promises to citizens.
In more general terms, political markets can be defined in 
relation to four key characteristics: incentives, rules, information 
and coordination.
incentives
Incentives are at the heart of transactional relationships. 
Politicians have an incentive to be seen to be delivering for 
their voters. often this leads to a focus on the delivery of 
short-term outputs, rather than longer-term development 
outcomes. If politicians cannot take credit for their efforts to 
improve, say, teacher quality, they have no incentive to pursue 
this improvement and voters will continue to expect low-quality 
teachers.
often underperforming states display the type of socially 
fragmented patronage politics as described above. where 
politicians feel that certain groups of voters will not be swayed 
to vote for them irrespective of what reforms they make, their 
incentives are aligned to serve those who do and will continue 
to vote for them. The negative consequences of such dynamics 
of ethnic fragmentation and clientist politics are clear :
l “…ethnic diversity is negatively correlated with the provision of 
 public goods such as the percentage of roads that are paved, 
 efficiency of the electricity network, and years of schooling of 
 the population.”3
l “For cities in the US, shares of public spending on productive 
 public goods – education, roads, sewers, and trash pick-up 
 – are inversely related to the city’s ethnic fragmentation.”4
l “…higher levels of local ethnic diversity in Kenya are associated 
 with sharply lower contributions to primary school funding 
 and worse school facilities.”5
rules
Sets of rules (that can be formally codified or informally 
understood) shape the roles, behaviours and expectations of 
social, political and economic actors. The fate of governance 
reforms depends on how existing formal and informal rules 
shape incentives for risk-taking in relation to reform, in contrast 
to the incentives they create for resisting reform and clinging to 
existing patronage systems. 
Institutional change can have a ripple effect on political markets. 
For example, enforceable legal reforms might not only change 
the nature and structure of relationships between government 
and citizens, but also impact on the values (informal rules) 
impinging on people’s perceptions and behaviour. Legal changes 
in relation to child labour and worker conditions become more 
effective when they permeate business and societal values; 
conversely legal change that is too distant from people’s realities 
and values is likely to remain an unwelcome and often avoided 
compliance cost.
information
Information is the means through which the formal and 
informal rules impinging on people and organisations translate 
into incentives. Information helps to define incentives, and 
it also helps to sharpen incentives. rules only work if people 
understand them, and have effective recourse to them. 
The empowering role of information in shaping incentives in 
political markets is seen in various contexts:
l “...between 1933 and 1935 in the US, federal assistance to 
 low-income households was greater in those counties where 
 more households had radios and were thus more likely to be 
 informed about government policies and programs.” 6
l “State governments in India are more responsive to declines 
 in food production and crop flood damage via public food 
 distribution and calamity relief expenditure when newspaper 
 circulation, particularly in local languages, is greater.” 7
coordination
As mentioned above, information is central to stylising the 
way in which incentives are shaped and responded to. How 
information is collected and represented is also critical. 
Ultimately, only through an election process can information 
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However,  for governments to listen and understand, information 
often needs to be collated, organised and channelled effectively 
to government. 
Governments simply cannot listen to everyone all of the time. 
Hence, coordination functions and mechanisms become vitally 
important elements of political markets. effective markets are 
those with institutional depth. Hence development agencies 
are increasingly recognising the importance of engaging with a 
wide range of channels to support the citizen-state relationship, 
including the media, the private sector, trades unions, political 
parties, citizens’ watchdogs and parliamentarians. Yet often 
the actors involved in their programmes tend to be the 
‘traditional’ partners such as international or national NGos or 
the government (at national and local levels). For example, an 
analysis of grantee organisations of the BeST-AC programme 
in Tanzaniaa showed clearly that those organisations that were 
funded, or were likely to meet the requirements for funding, 
were the very same organisations that had already attracted 
donor funding. 
effective states are critical for improved development outcomes. 
effective states can be defined by the quality of the transactional 
relationship between the state and its citizens. Transactions are 
defined by incentives, of citizens to demand the right things of 
government, and of government to respond appropriately to 
this demand. Incentives are defined by institutions, and made 
real by the strength of supporting information and coordination 
functions. All of these elements are central to the concept of a 
political market. 
As with other market systems relating to more conventional 
commodities, products and services, M4P has the potential to 
strengthen political markets to make them more effective and 
inclusive.
an M4P response to political markets
The above issues set the context for assessing the value M4P 
can bring to political markets.
A systems framework 
M4P’s strategic and organising framework can be applied to a 
basic picture of political markets (Figure 2).
The framework below is one which recognises that:
l markets are transactional in nature; 
l transactional incentives are shaped by institutions, the informal 
 and formal rules of the game;
l institutions are made real for core market players through the 
 richness of the information, coordination and other supporting 
 functions that serve as the connective tissue between core 
 market players;
l there are multiple stakeholders in a political market performing 
 a range of different roles in rule setting and delivering 
 supporting functions.
a The Business environment Strengthening for Tanzania (BeST) Programme aims at providing a more enabling environment for business in Tanzania. It is a multi-donor funded programme being implemented in 
 collaboration with the Government of  Tanzania. The programme was launched in December 2003.
figure 2
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M4P clearly offers a relevant strategic framework for organising 
political market factors and for bringing clarity to interventions. 
Major thrusts of reform programmes can be represented 
broadly in this framework:
l Core market – a major thrust of political market reform is 
 concerned with changing the structure of the core market. 
 Decentralisation efforts have focused on putting in place 
 structures that bring the source of the solution closer to the 
 sources of the problem. Privatisation and liberalisation efforts 
 are further attempts at changing core market structures. 
l rules – encouraging political competition through multi-party 
 democratic processes has been a major thrust of rules changes. 
 equally, rules seeking to change or moderate rent-seeking 
 behaviours in political markets continue to evolve. 
l Supporting functions – many reform efforts have focused 
 on strengthening and improving an increasingly wider variety 
 of advocacy and dialogue mechanisms in support of identified 
 drivers of change.b
understanding markets and analytical rigour
At the core of the market system are poor people and 
governments. The demand-side is represented by the concept 
of voice (of citizens), and the supply represented by the concept 
of accountability (of governments). M4P places a high premium 
on understanding markets and particularly the underlying 
causes (market imperfections) of disconnect between supply- 
and demand-side signals.
Focusing solely on either the voice or accountability side of the 
transaction is not enough. Unfortunately, as confirmed in Box 
1, many agency initiatives do just this – with the focus placed 
either on voice (eg funding to create spaces for citizens’ voice) 
or on accountability (eg an initiative to strengthen state capacity 
to respond). 
Box 1
Donor focus on either voice or accountability
An analysis8 of a sample of 90 interventions funded by the 
seven Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors in 
ten countries over the last 5-10 years provides some insights 
on how ‘voice and accountability’ has been translated into 
development practice.
Players: the focus has been mostly on national NGos (in 17% of 
the interventions considered) and government representatives 
at the central (21%) and local (17%) level. There has been 
relatively limited engagement of political parties, parliamenta-
rians, citizens’ watchdogs, community groups and the private 
sector which, combined, are involved in fewer than 10% of the 
interventions considered. State and non-state players have been 
only rarely involved in the same intervention. c
Through encouraging a focus on the relationship between 
citizens and the state M4P can help to bridge the divide 
between, on the one hand, those concerned with state building, 
reform processes and institutional capacity and, on the other 
hand, those with a more ‘bottom up’ perspective focusing on 
active citizenship, support for civil society and participatory 
approaches.
Taking a more coordinated and systemic perspective requires 
working not only with business and civil society organisations 
but also with and through government to better enable it to 
receive, understand and respond to improved advocacy. 
whether it is a cause, or an effect, of this situation, agencies also 
often fail to understand market imperfections in any detail. This 
lack of analysis is confirmed in the recent evaluation for the 
DAC referred to above, which reports that all too often donor-
funded programmes demonstrate very limited articulation 
of the causes (rather than symptoms) of poor governance in 
different types of countries and of how societies and states 
are transformed. rather than working from the existing reality, 
agencies tend to work back from a theoretical ideal, which 
sidelines any consideration of the incentives and constraints that 
shape behaviour.
M4P offers an organising framework within which tools for 
political, social and economic analysis can be used more 
effectively in presenting a more complete and systemic analysis 
than is currently the case.
interconnected markets
Interconnected markets are central to M4P. what are seen 
as supporting functions in one market can be seen as market 
systems in their own right. In relation to political markets for 
example, effective information and coordination functions are 
critical to a well-functioning political market.
The mass media are increasingly seen as a key source of 
information. Certainly, reforms to solve information problems 
in political markets should include reforms to free up the mass 
media. This central role of mass media in governance has become 
increasingly relevant to development over the past decade. 
In many developing countries government monopoly over 
the mass media has dissolved to allow the growth of diverse 
privately owned media industries. Mass media have become less 
and less a government mouthpiece and have begun to play a 
more important role in democratic government. This relatively 
recent change is illustrated by the dates of the launch of the 
first private radio stations in various African and Asian countries 
(Table 1). This liberalisation and diversification of mass media 
offers a new opportunity to tap into the potential of the media 
to become a positive driver of good governance. 
b Drivers of Change, an approach used by DFID, is a way of understanding the political economy of change and poverty reduction in developing countries.
c See elliott, D, Hitchins, r, Sulzer, M (2006); Improving the environment for small businesses in Indonesia and Russia: Experiences from Swisscontact; Making Markets work for the Poor Case Studies Series; SDC, 
 for a case of strengthening voice and accountability through such actors.
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table 1
radio liberalisation in selected countries – year of launch of 
first private radio station
Understanding the existing and potential role of the mass media 
in governance, and more specifically in bringing about reform 
in the business environment, is therefore important and timely. 
recent research in Uganda9 provides evidence that under 
the right conditions private media can perform more public 
functions – eg in relation to voice and advocacy – and can be 
a proactive driver of pro-poor reform initiatives. Making media 
markets work for the poor should be a key objective of voice 
and accountability reform processes. 
with regard to coordination functions, much agency support 
for voice and accountability aims goes through advocacy 
organisations, of one kind or another. o’Neil has shown that such 
intermediaries were more likely to be international (with 62% 
of total funding) rather than national (with 38% of total funding) 
actors.  Arguably in response to this, some agencies are trying to 
shift focus to supporting more home grown initiatives. DFID is 
one such donor which is increasingly supporting the competitive 
disbursement of funds to local advocacy organisations – be they 
trade unions, civil society or business membership organisations 
(BMos).d However, as mentioned earlier, all too often such 
demand-side financing is not matched with interventions to 
support supply-side response. 
equally, there are question marks over the bluntness of the 
funding approach to advocacy. How sustainable will national 
advocacy movements be, if they are conditional on continued 
external donor finance? In the case of BMos, members often 
undervalue the advocacy functions of their organisation. Initiatives 
aimed at improving voice – the capacity of the BMo to better 
make and express its demands to government – should also be 
concerned with translating successes into helping members to 
revalue advocacy functions and, accordingly, to pay more of the 
costs for them.
In the examples of media and advocacy given above, both are 
supporting functions in a more systemic view of political markets. 
equally both can be seen as ‘markets’ in their own right, and a 
more systemic approach to intervention (beyond just financing 
at the core) should be followed by donors. M4P guides and 
supports such a perspective.
facilitation as the route to sustainable change
“Countries most in need of state reform are least able to 
implement it.”10 This view is confirmed in 2004 world Bank 
review of Development effectiveness (world Bank),11 which 
confirms that “...efforts have been more successful in countries 
where:
l they are politically stable; 
l there is strong ownership of reform; 
l the executive, the legislature, and the bureaucracy are working 
 for common purposes; and
l the country has the administrative capacity to implement 
 reforms. 
The Bank’s efforts have been less successful where one or all of 
these elements have been lacking.”
An M4P perspective would suggest that reform approaches are 
based on a systemic view. The systemic perspective of M4P is 
one of multiple functions undertaken by a range of players. In this 
sense M4P offers a multi-function and multi-player framework. 
efforts at reform need to look beyond ‘technical’ solutions that 
consider changes to market functions as sufficient. They also 
need to consider ‘institutional’ solutions, through addressing 
‘who’ can / should perform the required market functions. 
However, identifying what needs to happen, and being clear on 
who should do it, is only part of the solution. Understanding 
incentives that would support, or otherwise, those stakeholders 
playing a different role (and continuing to play this role after a 
period of intervention) is equally critical and one where M4P 
can offer insight. As confirmed in a recent multi-country review 
of DFID-funded economic governance reform programmes,12 
in spite of all activities having an appropriate strategic focus:
“In general, a clear distinction between transactional and trans-
formational (capacity development) objectives was not made in 
the specification of the objectives of project activities, and most 
activities did not clearly articulate how transformational impact was 
to be brought about.”
Not surprisingly then, the findings confirm that support has 
often introduced better systems and procedures, but only in 
a minority of the cases was genuine capacity development and 
performance improvement identified. The root cause of this 
poor result was identified as lack of understanding of incentives 
within the target organisations (incentivising staff to play modified 
roles) and between government departments (recognising the 
validity of the new / expanded roles). 
Agencies can only support national reform efforts. This requires 
facilitating change in others. At the heart of this facilitation 
challenge is the requirement to understand and respond to 
incentives. whilst it is not always fully captured or codified, M4P 
d DFID is funding an increasing number of challenge funds in various countries around the world. See www.dfid.gov.uk for more information on these.
Mali : 1991
Uganda : 1993
Zambia :   1993
Sri Lanka :  1993
Senegal :   1994
Tanzania :  1994 
Ghana : 1995
Pakistan : 1995 
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takes the facilitation challenge very seriously and is generating 
considerable insight into the process of successful facilitation. 
This experience could well support the facilitation challenges 
facing political market reform.
conclusions
The role of government is often critical to the performance of 
market systems; therefore the efficacy of the political decision-
making process – in particular its responsiveness to the genuine 
needs of the poor – is a central concern. This paper has 
demonstrated that the process of political decision-making can 
be seen as taking place in political markets and can be viewed 
practically through the same M4P prism as other commodities, 
products and services with the poor as the demand-side and 
government as the supply-side in the core of the market.
How well political markets function is dependent on a number 
of factors; most importantly the appropriateness of incentives, 
information, rules and coordination. In this context, M4P can add 
value by providing a relevant systemic framework within which 
to assess the political decision-making process and the roles 
of different players within it; by highlighting the importance of 
interconnected markets (such as the media) in making political 
markets work more effectively and providing guidance for 
facilitators to act to bring about meaningful change.
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this paper focuses on the application of M4P to the issue 
of climate change. While climate change does not refer to 
a specific market it is an environmental phenomenon that 
(a) subsumes within it a range of related market systems and 
(b) is perceived to have such potentially far-reaching, damaging 
implications for developing nations that it is of increasing 
importance to most development agencies and governments. 
The paper first establishes the wider importance of climate 
change to global development and then focuses more 
specifically on its relevance to low-income countries and to 
poor people within them. In this context it then identifies 
three issues which are central to the climate change challenge 
and views these through the ‘lens’ of M4P. Finally, it concludes 
with comments on the applicability and limitations of M4P to 
climate change.
importance and relevance for the poor
Climate change stems from increasing greenhouse gases – or 
carbon dioxide equivalent (Co
2
e) – in the atmosphere caused 
by rising energy and non-energy emissions.a Co
2
e levels have 
risen to around 430 parts per million (ppm) from 280ppm at 
the start of the Industrial revolution. even with no increase 
in emissions (and they are growing), because of the time lags 
involved, this will grow to 550ppm by 2050. 
At an aggregate level, climate change will result in lower economic 
growth. The Stern report 1 estimated that action to stabilise at 
550ppm would cost around 1% of global GDP annually. The 
total costs of not taking action, however (a ‘business as usual’ 
scenario), were estimated at equivalent to a 5-20% reduction 
in consumption per head. As well as the wider poverty-related 
problems emerging from lower incomes, climate change will 
cause:
l water shortages – a decline in the quantity and quality of water 
 in many areas;
l decline in agricultural productivity – this will be especially 
 apparent in more marginal areas of Africa (such as the Sahel) 
 where lower production is forecast;
l inundation of low-lying areas – some countries, such as 
 Bangladesh, may lose significant land area;
l more, and more intense, storms: changes in weather patterns 
 will increase the preponderance of violent and damaging 
 storms;
l degradation of the environment: loss of species and ecosystems 
 will undermine specific economic activities as well as wider 
 quality of life.
Some people and areas – especially those in higher latitudes 
– may benefit from climate change, for example from a longer 
growing season. But most people will experience a loss in their 
quality of life and the poorest countries and the poorest people 
will suffer most because of:
l Geographical disadvantage: the poor live in areas – tropical 
 and sub-tropical – where there are fewer gains and more 
 losses from climate change.
l Dependence on agriculture: the poor, typically, have higher 
 dependence on agriculture as a source of income, so declining 
 crop yields will impact on them relatively more than the 
 average.
l Greater vulnerability to change: the poor are more at threat 
 from natural disasters (which will increase) and less able 
 – being more risk averse and with less information and lower 
 capacities – to adapt their habits to new circumstances.
l Dependence on growth-derived benefits: growth has been 
 the key driver of poverty reduction; a fall in growth will tend 
 to impact disproportionately on the poor.
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while there is considerable debate over the extent of climate 
change and how this will manifest itself in the future, the above 
represents a mainstream view and one with which most agencies 
and governments concur. 
key challenges in addressing climate change: the M4P 
perspective
The ubiquitous nature of climate change (the weather!), the 
daunting nature of its scale and the uncertainties over its 
causes and manifestations add to the challenge of seeking to 
address it through concerted action. For some, the idea that 
the environment can be viewed and acted upon through the 
prism of market systems may appear bizarre or even offensive. 
others point to the overarching importance of global political 
agreement – over for example emissions – as the core issue. Yet 
the Stern report itself viewed climate change as “the greatest 
and widest-ranging market failure ever seen”.  As in most markets, 
the effect of this market dysfunction falls most on those least 
able to take action to escape its consequences. 
Taking Stern’s market failure as the starting point for this analysis, 
an M4P perspective is particularly important in addressing three 
related market systems:
l the carbon market; 
l the market for more energy-efficient and environmentally 
 friendly technologies and processes; and
l consumer markets.  
For each of these, M4P, as an approach that is about under- 
standing and then acting to change markets, offers improved 
clarity in analysis and guidance for intervention, ie it is both 
about what agencies do and how they do it. M4P’s value-added 
stems from, among other features:
l developing a transparent view of a market system and of the 
 functions (core transactions, rules and supporting functions) 
 and players within it;
l building interventions on the basis of a detailed understanding 
 of markets – including interconnected markets – and the poor 
 within them; 
l identifying underlying systemic constraints; and 
l placing sustainability at the heart of the intervention process.
How can carbon markets be developed to operate more 
effectively?
Carbon markets have been created both voluntarily and through 
regulation to give value to Co
2
e (carbon for short) as a tradable 
commodity.b  2 In the more developed markets, buyers purchase 
certificates from sellers verifying defined reductions in Co
2
e 
from specific projects. From a development and environmental 
perspective, the rationale for the market is that it provides a means 
through which the externality of emissions can be internalised 
within markets. Carbon markets offer a more economical method 
of reducing carbon emissions than, for example, investing in new 
plant and equipment. Typically, the cost of reducing one tonne of 
Co
2
e in industrialised nations is $15-$100. However, the cost of 
achieving a similar reduction in developing economies is often much 
less ($1-$4 per tonne), thus offering a reason for them to buy.
There are broadly two types of carbon market.3 First, the 
compliance-driven market. This has been created by compliance 
requirements emerging from the Kyoto protocol under which 
industrialised country signatories have pledged to reduce their 
emissions by 5.2% in the 2008-2012 period relative to a 1990 
baseline. Most carbon trade takes place the eU emission Trading 
Scheme (eTS)c and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).d 
Second, but relatively small, are voluntary markets under which 
buyers and sellers exchange, on an offset basis but outside the 
provisions and regulations of official agreements. Much of this is 
dominated by forestry projects. 
At first sight, growth in the carbon market appears impressive. In 
2007 the market grew to a value of $64 bn, more than twice its 
2006 level, reflecting both increased volumes and higher carbon 
prices. However, beyond this aggregate positive picture there is 
a more complicated reality. Most emission trading is done within 
the eTS, by far the biggest market. CDM transactions, providing 
the main mechanism for developing countries, are dominated by 
China (three-quarters of transactions) with only 1% from Africa. 
Growth has come primarily from utilities or experienced operators 
using trusted and known technologies (eg industrial gases). In other 
words, as in any market, initial growth has come from the safest and 
most established players.  The market has not advanced substantially 
to more difficult (and poorer) countries, smaller players and more 
innovative carbon-reducing technologies related to renewable 
energy and energy efficiency.
A number of reasons appear to lie behind the rather mixed 
performance of both compliance and voluntary carbon markets.
l High transaction costs of engaging in the market: the process 
 through which projects can qualify to sell carbon is complicated, 
 lengthy and expensive. It involves application to national 
 authorities in accordance with a standard format, external 
 inspection of proposals by accredited parties (designated 
 operational entities [Does]) and external monitoring. The 
 pipeline through which projects must pass takes 1-2 years. 
 Delays tend to favour larger projects with healthy finances.
l Capacity constraints: becoming a Doe costs euro 150,000 
 and is an 18-month process. There are few Does – they are 
 a substantial bottleneck with projects reporting that it takes 
 six months to engage them. on the project development side, 
 there are limitations in the expertise available to develop new 
 projects.
l Lack of transparency over reporting standards: in the 
b Unless otherwise stated, data in this section is taken from State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2008.
c A so-called ‘cap and trade’ programme – regulated entities trade allocated allowances within a cap set by regulation. They can, however, purchase from buyers outside the cap.




PAPer 8: M4P AND CLIMATe CHANGe 
Perspectives on the Making Markets work for the Poor (M4P) Approach
r
 voluntary market there is a growing (and confusing) number of 
 independently established standards. The resulting confusion 
 over how carbon savings should be calculated tends to 
 undermine the credibility of the market’s ‘currency’ and 
 therefore the market itself.
l An uncertain future: provisions under the Kyoto agreement 
 last until 2012 but the nature of the regulatory framework 
 beyond this is unclear. There is a widespread view that 
 important mechanisms such as the CDM need to be reformed 
 but until there is clarity on the nature of this reform, a cloud of 
 uncertainty will continue to hang over the market.
The M4P perspective: bringing clarity to the market development 
task
This strand of the climate change challenge is, in many ways, 
a direct market development task. Indeed, one of the key 
protagonists in the field – the world Bank’s Carbon Finance 
Unit4 – describes its role as that of market facilitator. Having 
been created through global regulation, the task facing agencies 
and governments globally is how to further develop this nascent 
market system. In this context, M4P appears to offer a number 
of benefits.
First, it offers greater clarity. A fundamental problem with the 
carbon market is its complexity.  This creates immediate barriers 
both to potential participants in the market and to development 
agencies that instinctively feel they may have a role to play 
but find the carbon market daunting and confusing. Figure 1 
presents a rough schematic of the market. Clearly, the analysis 
above demonstrates that there are significant constraints related 
to both rules and supporting functions. rules, by their nature, 
require action at a national or international level whereas more 
localised interventions are possible in relation to supporting 
functions.
Second, given a clearer picture of the overall market, it becomes 
easier to identify and define potential intervention areas that 
can contribute to a more functional system. There is currently 
widespread concern over the existing rules regime. In particular, 
there is tension between, on the one hand, the high transaction 
costs imposed (especially for poorer countries, generating the 
suspicion that rules are another form of trade restraint) and, on 
the other hand, the need for rigour and credibility in rules. As 
in other areas of global certification – such as food products – 
where similar tensions are evident, there is a need to explore 
workable compromises between these two concerns. Setting 
the right rules regime requires intervention at an international 
level initially and then nationally – and this is likely to be practical 
only for some agencies.
More immediately, the task of creating the right supporting 
functions in different countries has to be addressed. In addition 
to the limited number of Does mentioned above, many 
developing countries lack the infrastructure of brokers, advisors, 
consultants and financiers who are necessary to develop local 
figure 1
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markets. Their capacity is weak and their links with international 
providers limited. The capacity of national governments – 
‘designated national authorities’ in the carbon market – is variable.5 
Information for potential project developers on how to develop 
viable projects that comply with international rules, and therefore 
can generate tradable carbon gains, is scant. These constitute 
interconnected service markets and, as in other sectors, are open to 
the same M4P analytical framework and rules for intervention. Key 
constraints to be addressed here include poor linkages, capacities 
and information. The challenge is to address these to stimulate 
new activity – requiring in many places active interventions – and 
to enhance the incentives and capacities necessary for a vibrant, 
sustainable market.
How can markets for more energy-efficient and  
environmentally-friendly technologies be developed?
one of the main interconnected markets in the carbon 
market system (Figure 1) is that for more energy-efficient and 
environmentally friendly technologies. This includes technologies 
related directly to energy production – such as solar photovoltaic 
cells (for electricity generation), solar panels for water heating, 
wind, tidal and wave power, biomass/energy crops and heat pump 
technologies – and better use of energy, such as new industrial 
plant and domestic equipment. For climate change to be addressed 
(aided by and contributing to a functioning carbon market), a 
central challenge is to achieve more widespread development, 
adaptation, purchase and use of these technologies.
Although the picture varies regionally and with technology, the 
general situation is one of relatively slow take-up. Currently around 
13% of global primary energy is accounted for by renewable 
sources – but most of this is hydropower. In terms of ‘new’ 
technologies – eg solar, wind and wave – the figure is less than 
0.5%. This is despite the strong evidence of wider environmental 
benefits from these technologies. one key reason cited for the 
relatively slight take-up of new technologies has been their low 
rates of return for individual users/investors – private returns do 
not reflect the positive externalities associated with renewable 
technologies (hence the rationale for the carbon market). 
However, in an era of higher oil prices, the immediate commercial 
attractiveness of energy technologies has changed significantly. In 
relation to producers and consumers of energy technologies, the 
key question ahead for agencies and governments is: what other 
actions are required to allow greater use of renewable and more 
energy-efficient technologies?
The M4P perspective: beyond price, addressing other constraints to 
growth and access
The correction to relative prices in the energy market eases one 
central (incentive) constraint to growth. However, as in most 
markets, it is unlikely that this, by itself, will result in the degree of 
transformative change that may be possible and, it might be argued, 
is required. For that to happen, other constraints preventing the 
development of the market system will need to be addressed. 
M4P allows a considered and comprehensive approach to the 
identification and prioritisation of these constraints. Depending on 
local context, a number of potential focal areas for intervention 
might emerge:
l The research and development/private sector divide: as in 
 other markets (eg agriculture) a familiar challenge is how 
 to take new and promising ideas developed in publicly funded 
 research organisations and have these further developed and 
 disseminated by private sector players in markets. This bridge 
 between public and private good – and the processes and 
 relationships which define it – is often weak.
l The innovation barrier : building on from the above, for the 
 market to develop and change, private companies must 
 invest in the development and distribution of new 
 technologies. As with other product areas (eg financial 
 services) where mainstream private providers have previously 
 played little role but now see the commercial attractiveness 
 of low-income and/or niche markets, the challenge is how to 
 stimulate new (risk-taking) innovation. In the past (and 
 currently) agencies’ interventions have tended to crowd out 
 private sector interest by taking a direct role in the market 
 as a supplier or by favouring one provider over another. Yet, 
 there is no doubt that companies do tread warily into new 
 ‘bottom of the pyramid’ markets. The opportunities here are 
 for agencies to encourage change – by, for example, 
 providing better information on market potential or selective 
 and conditional support to a lead firm – throughout the 
 market system towards more innovative business models 
 that effectively enhance the access of low income groups to 
 new technologies.
l The information gap: information constraints for both supply- 
 and demand-sides are often acute – with market players 
 not having enough information to make rational decisions.e 
 Commonly, agencies have supported individual technologies 
 and providers – sometimes through direct marketing 
 support – but neglected the wider information constraint. 
 Improving the information environment can be an important 
 role for facilitators, for example through direct social 
 marketing campaigns, supporting a public player (such as a 
 business membership organisation [BMo]) to play this role or 
 working with the media to encourage them to see the value 
 in highlighting the potential benefits of new technologies.6
l Developing the services infrastructure: as with the carbon 
 market and other product areas, knowledge and information 
 are assuming more importance in the market for energy 
 technologies. This often takes the form of improved services 
e It is widely accepted that most market systems in developing countries are relatively information-poor.
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f For example, 22 different national and international certification schemes are listed by international agencies in the aquaculture industry.
 – offered by suppliers as an embedded part of their offer to 
 consumers or from specialist consultants, brokers and advisers. 
 Facilitating the development of these services and service 
 providers is a central part of developing the energy technology 
 market.
How can consumer pressure become a positive force for 
change?
The power of consumers to influence corporate behaviour is 
evident in a number of product areas. In some cases pressure is 
manifested in formal systems of industry/legal standards – such 
as food and health – and in other cases less formally, for example 
through corporates’ own codes of conduct in the garment 
sector. Consumer power is open to influence and can be ill-
informed, especially in relation to the activities of producers in 
distant places but:
l it is increasingly important and, in a global economy, its 
 importance seems likely to grow; and
l this growth will embrace climate change issues – indeed, this is 
 already happening.
In this context,  a variety of independent voluntary standards have 
arisen to ‘encourage’ consumers to check on the climate change 
credentials of products, in particular to gauge the appropriateness 
of offset projects. Some of these seek to follow the practice 
of the recognised carbon market, while others are tied closely 
to companies’ own practice. As a consequence, there is little 
comparability between these standards. For corporate investors 
this is increasingly problematic, with many now complaining of 
a ‘greenwash’ phenomenon – “vague qualitative disclosures” that 
do not permit transparent examination of performance.7 
Carbon labelling of products (especially food) is an attempt 
to replace this diversity and confusion with ‘objective’ 
measurement of carbon content. There are, however, formidable 
methodological issues associated with carbon labelling. The 
favoured approach of life cycle assessment is inherently complex 
and requires consistency in relation to key issues, for example 
whether electricity from renewable sources should be treated 
in the same way as that from other sources.8 Moreover, there 
appears to be no simple way in which carbon labelling can be 
made consistent with the carbon market. 
The M4P perspective: developing services to promote access and 
inclusive market development
Consumer markets are likely to become a growing influence on 
climate change. The challenge for agencies is to shape this trend 
so that it allows:
l consumers to make rational, informed choices – standards 
 have to be sufficiently rigorous;
l developing country producers to access markets – standards 
 and processes have to be sufficiently inclusive.
The danger currently is that neither objective is being achieved. 
The multiplicity of standards being developed mirrors trends in 
other product areasf where standards are in danger of losing their 
authority and credibility.  And for developing country producers, 
certification costs often constitute a relatively greater cost 
burden than that of their high-income country competitors.
In this context, M4P again offers a clearer picture of the 
market development challenge and sets out the areas where 
intervention is required. First, in response to the plethora of 
standards emerging, greater coordination is necessary to 
produce standard reporting and methodologies. This, in practice, 
is only likely to be done by governments and agencies. Second, 
developing standards that take inclusivity seriously means 
developing not just appropriate standards but functioning 
services and processes in low-income countries relating to 
both the imposition of standards and building capacity to meet 
standards. without these steps, consumer markets are unlikely 
to be able to exert significantly positive pressures on climate 
change.
conclusions
This paper has set out three key issues that need to be confronted 
if action on climate change is to be effective and poor people 
in particular are not to be burdened by its consequences. The 
climate change challenge is obviously large and complicated.  Yet, 
at its heart – as recognised by the Stern report – it is about 
improving the functioning of market systems. For climate change 
to be addressed, three related markets need to operate more 
effectively: the carbon market, the market for energy-efficient 
technologies and the market for consumer products (especially 
food). 
The climate change challenge can essentially be seen as 
a market development challenge. In this context, M4P is 
particularly relevant. As in other spheres, the value it adds is 
first by offering clarity in analysis – a transparent means through 
which governments and development agencies can examine 
the different market systems impinging on climate change and 
their own role in developing it. while some issues are specific 
to climate change, such as the modus operandi of carbon market 
operations, it has many issues in common with other markets 
such as how to develop standards, services, information and new 
business models that promote growth and access. Second, given 
this clarity, M4P potentially offers value by providing guidance for 
interventions – not only what these should focus on but how 
they are implemented.
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